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Introduction 
One of the central claims about the motivation for research on political mass participation 
is that ―mass participation is essential to the lifeblood of representative democracy‖.1 
Therefore, in order to sustain a democracy, the interest and active engagement in politics 
of as many people as possible and in as many spheres of influence as possible is 
required.2 Political participation can embrace very different forms, such as voting, 
participation in political campaigns, the signing of petitions and diverse others. These are 
the so called ―conventional‖ forms of political participation. The study at hand, however, 
will focus on political protest which belongs to the so-called ―unconventional‖ forms of 
participation encompassing demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins or the outbreak of political 
violence.3 For Knoll and Herkenrath, political protest action refers to ―some of the most 
visible manifestations of social conflict‖.4 This means that in the case of unconventional 
political participation materializing, social conflict and society‘s disagreement with the 
government or its policies are being made visible. Yet, if there is no unconventional 
political action in a society, especially when major changes are evolving, it does not 
simply mean that there is no civil discontent. It is possible that in such cases societies are 
not in possession of the right preconditions, chances, motivations or the adequate tools to 
manifest their political action. This can in particular be exemplified in times of major 
changes in societies – such as economic or other crises. 
Crises in general and economic crises in particular have a special connection to the rise of 
political participation and especially political protest. Economic crises can create the 
potential for growing political participation through ―a combination of high levels of social 
unrest, unstable electoral alignments, and a high salience of economic and social issues‖.5 
Therefore, a thorough insight into the reaction of civil societies towards the performance 
of their governments in critical time periods can explicitly be examined when comparing 
societies that were hit by the same crisis to an approximately similar degree. Why do 
some civil societies participate more in political protest in times of crises than others? 
                                           
 
1 Norris 2002: 215. 
2 Yilmaz-Huber 2006: 25.  
3 van Deth 2006: 172. 
4 Knoll/Herkenrath 2011: 163. 
5 Kolb 2007: 71. 
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The most recent financial crisis that began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank in 
September 2008 in the United States and spread throughout the world with immense 
pace has majorly damaged the European economy. According to the European 
Commission in 2009: 
―The European economy is in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s, with 
real GDP projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in the history 
of the European Union‖.6 
The European Union (EU) is an economic and political confederation of 27 states and the 
most diverse conglomeration of countries in the world. The 2008-2010 economic and 
financial crisis had a varying effect on the countries of this union. Some were damaged 
early and hard, others fell from the initial financial crisis right into the next Euro-crisis, still 
others managed to come out of the crisis as winners. The governments of many of those 
countries that were hit to a high degree have tried to dampen the crisis by introducing 
several anti-crisis measures. One aspect that makes the study of the recent financial crisis 
interesting from the political science point of view is the reaction of the civil society 
towards such anti-crisis measures. Reactions in societies of EU-countries were mixed, 
ranging from major protest mobilization to a silent acceptance of political imposition and 
resilience. This circumstance leads to the general question of the study at hand:  
Why do some countries have a higher degree of protest against anti-crisis 
measures than other countries? 
Research on political participation and political protest with a special connection to crises 
in general and financial crises in particular is rather rare and findings are rather 
unsophisticated.7 This study aims at illuminating political participation in connection with 
financial and economic crises. The recent global economic and financial crisis that began 
in the US in 2008 has spread throughout the world with extreme speed and ―transformed 
into the most severe global financial crisis since the Great Depression‖.8 From a political 
participation theory perspective this process is inspiring because it is unique in its 
dimension and allows for extensive cross-national comparison. The regional interest of 
this study is focused on regional developments in Eastern Europe from a comparative 
                                           
 
6 European Commission 07/2009: iii. 
7 A theoretical assessment on the connection between economic crises and political protest can be found in 
Hudson (1971). Glasberg and Shannon (2001) analyze the impact of the involvement of international 
institutions in domestic economic policies in times of crises and their connection to political protest. Besides 
that, the literature on protest behavior in times of crises is limited. 
8 Claessen et al 2009: 683. 
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angle. Thus, the recent global financial crisis constitutes an interesting aspect for the 
research on political protest in this region in comparison to others. Taking into account 
the common historical experiences, namely the communist heritage of more than fifty 
years throughout Eastern Europe, the assumption that the civil society reaction to the 
recent crisis might have been alike across Eastern European states seems obvious. 
However, to the contrary of this simplistic postulation, in the course of the financial crisis 
2008-2010 more parallels across the East-West ―borderline‖ have become obvious than 
within each region. The countries that were hit first and hardest by the crisis range from 
Ireland to the Baltic States. Similarly, in their anti-crisis measures, countries such as 
Ireland and Latvia or Hungary and Spain have revealed more connections than 
neighboring Eastern European states.9 
This study will explore dissimilarities in degrees of political protesting as responses to 
anti-crisis measures in the European Union with the tools of a positivist research design. A 
positivist design employs a ―natural-science-model‖ for social science research to explain, 
predict or control empirical observations with the means of theoretical explanations.10 It 
uses the rules of formal logic in order to deduct testable hypotheses from underlying 
theory, bearing in mind that theory in positivism represents a set of causal laws and 
hypotheses.11 Hypotheses, in turn, are intersubjectively comprehensible and testable 
conclusions.12 In this study, testable hypotheses will be derived from political participation 
research, namely the socioeconomic status model and the political opportunity structure 
approach. From hypotheses based on these theories, independent (explaining) variables 
(IV) will be generated and subsequently tested for their influence on the dependent 
variable (DV, the variable that has to be explained) political protest. In order to produce a 
valid case sample for the case study, control variables (CV) will be included in the 
research design. Then, the countries for the case study will be selected based on the 
highest variation on the independent variable.13 The initial universe of cases will contain 
all 27 countries of the European Union. 
Formally, the analysis will at first focus on the object of the research – the dependent 
variable political protest, which will be defined, conceptualized and operationalized in the 
next chapter. Following the presentation of the dependent variable, the study will be 
                                           
 
9 Gorzelak 2010: 251. 
10 Lee 1991: 343.  
11 van Evera 1997: 12. 
12 Früh 2007: 69. 
13 van Evera 1997: 29. 
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given a thorough theoretical basis in chapter 3. Herein, various theories on political 
participation and political protest study will be presented and those most appropriate for 
the study at hand will be chosen to be developed in the subsequent chapter on the 
research design of the study. Prior to selecting the cases for the final case study, the 
methodology case selection will be depicted in chapter 5. After the case selection based 
on methodological reasoning the case study will be conducted in chapter 7. Finally, 
conclusions from the case study referring to the validity of theories and hypotheses 
applied will be drawn. The research will close by summarizing statements and thoughts 
for further research on political protest in times of major economic and financial crises. 
1. Political Protest – the Object of Research  
1.1 Definitional Matters - the Conceptualization of Political 
Participation and Political Protest 
For social and political scientists the minimum definition of political participation14 is 
understood as ―activities of private citizens intended to influence state structures, 
authorities and/or decisions regarding the allocation of public goods‖.15 Political 
participation is categorized in different ways. As stated in the introduction, the common 
differentiation of political participation follows a separation in ―conventional‖ and 
―unconventional‖ forms, whereby activities such as voting, the signing of petitions or 
participation in political campaigns are ―conventional‖ whereas demonstrations, sit-ins or 
even outbreaks of political violence are considered ―unconventional‖. Political protest, 
often also referred to as ―protesting‖, ―protest action‖, ―protest activity‖, ―protest 
mobilization‖ or ―protest movement‖16, usually is subsumed under the ―unconventional‖ 
mode of political participation in social science theory. Moreover, it is considered the most 
complex form of political participation17. In a broader definition on the individual level it 
means ―a collective, public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses criticism or 
                                           
 
14 In order to maintain definitional clarity, the terms ―political participation‖, ―political engagement‖, ―collective 
action‖ or ―political activism‖ shall be used as synonyms in this study. 
15 Roller/Wessels 1996: 4. For a thorough account on the development of different forms of political 
participation as well as their categorization over time see van Deth 2006: 183f. 
16 For the sake of terminological accuracy these terms shall be used as synonyms in this paper. 
17 Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9. 
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dissent and articulates a societal or political demand‖.18 It is categorized in different ways. 
One way is to look at the legal/illegal aspects of political protest: political protest as a 
direct and non-institutionalized mode of participation can appear legally, as in attending 
lawful demonstrations and illegally, which can be further differentiated in non-violent 
forms such as joining unofficial strikes and violent forms such as damaging property.19 
Kriesi follows a wider categorization and depicts four categories of active forms of political 
protest activities: (1) conventional, e.g. juridical, political or media-directed strategies, (2) 
direct-democratic activities, e.g. civic initiatives and referendums, (3) demonstrative 
activities like demonstrations and protest marches, (4) confrontational action forms that 
are in turn separated in legal and illegal provocative activities, such as legal boycotts and 
sit-ins, illegal demonstrations or limited as well as strong violence like violent 
demonstrations and attacks.20 The clarity of this differentiation shall be applied in this 
study which will focus on the forms of demonstrative and confrontational activities. 
The research on political protest activism bears many parallels to research on social 
movements due to the fact that social movements are also generally classified into the 
category of unconventional participation.21 Whereas political protest as a concept is one 
form of unconventional political participation, social movements represent a broader 
concept that makes use not only of unconventional forms of participation but also refers 
to conventional possibilities. Social movements are ―collective challenges to existing 
arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity, 
in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities‖.22 It shall be emphasized 
that the term ―sustained‖ is what distinguishes social movements from political protest 
action. The latter is not limited to an enduring expression of discontent, but rather 
occurring and ending in a spontaneous manner. This ―episodic‖ character of protest 
events is crucial for the definition and later operationalization of the concept.23 Protests, 
just like social movements, are a matter of groups and organizations. Nevertheless, the 
essential difference between these two is that ―social movements tend to protest, but not 
                                           
 
18 Rucht/Neidhardt 1998: 68. 
19 Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 88. 
20 Kriesi 1995a: 267f. 
21 Social movements as against to protest activities are ―pertinent, organized, and collective efforts to resist 
existing power structures, cultural repertoires, and practices and elite dominance and oppression or to 
introduce changes in them (...). They are organizational structures and strategies that may provide 
organizational opportunities for producing change from the bottom up within nations. In addition, they may 
allow the relatively powerless to affect international relations as well.‖ (Glasberg/Shannon 2011: 150). 
22 Meyer 1998: 4. 
23 Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 88. 
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all protests are conducted by social movements‖.24 This means that protest action is one 
form of political participation, whereas social movements can at times even be considered 
as actors in the study of political (unconventional) participation. Therefore, drawing a 
clear line between political protesting and social movements in this study is critical. 
Another definitional allocation has to be shown in order to clarify per definition what is 
meant by political protesting in this research. It is the distinction between the potential for 
protest mobilization and actual protest mobilization. On the one hand, potential for 
protest mobilization embraces those people in a society who are theoretically willing to be 
mobilized for political protest. On the other hand, actual protest mobilization refers to 
those citizens who are actually being mobilized by a certain protest at a certain time.25 
Following the definitions of political protest presented above, potential for protest 
mobilization shall be unequivocally set apart from the actual ―protest mobilization‖. This 
study will explicitly focus on actual protest mobilization and avoid mobilization potential.  
 
As stated above, the working definition of political protest in this study is ―a collective, 
public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses criticism or dissent and 
articulates a societal or political demand‖.26 The concept contains two terms – ‗political‘ 
and ‗protest‘. While the former is a direct hint to the aims of protest – political events and 
decisions made by politicians (policies), the latter points to the form of participation, 
namely its unconventional characteristic. As has already been depicted, protest is not 
subject to individual action but rather to the action of groups and organizations – 
collective non-governmental actors aiming to affect the interests of particular groups in a 
society.27 The level of analysis of the political protest in the study is thus the aggregated 
micro-level. 
Research on political protest in particular or unconventional participation in general has 
genuinely started to develop only after the eventful 1960s and 1970s. For instance, Kaase 
and Marsh, writing on political action in 1979, still had difficulties deciding while 
conceptualizing political participation, whether protest or unconventional participation in 
general is a legitimate (because not yet ultimately legal) form of political participation or 
                                           
 
24 Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9. 
25 Kriesi 1992: 24ff. 
26 Rucht/Neidhardt 1998: 68. 
27 Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 9. 
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not.28 Hence, the question arises of what is political protest today and why is it worth 
looking at?  
According to Norris, there are several reasons to focus on protest action when analyzing 
political participation: (1) protest activism by today accounts for a distinct dimension of 
political participation and is one of its essential components, (2) during the last decades 
of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st century this form of participation has become 
increasingly popular and widespread, and finally (3) protest politics as of today have 
increasingly become ―mainstream‖ and embrace all spheres and stratums of society.29 
When political protest occurs in a country, one either has been a witness or even a 
participant in the action or, in the most likely case, has come to know about it through 
the media, be it via television, radio, newspapers or the internet. This implies that the 
research on political protest mainly has to rely on various medial sources when 
considering the occurrence and the dimension of political protest. How this highly 
ambiguous concept can be operationalized and conveyed as a measurable indicator for 
analysis will be shown in the next section. 
1.2  The Degree of Political Protest - Operationalization 
This study employs a positivist research design which implies the testing of hypotheses 
that will be formulated from the theories on political participation in the next chapter in 
order to prove their validity or falsify them in a comparative case study. Thus, the aim is 
to prove the applicability of the theories chosen for the explanation of political protest in 
times of crises. As already stated in the introduction, this study is unique so far in the way 
that political protest in times of crises has rarely been looked at, not to mention its 
analysis from the socioeconomic and political opportunity structure point of view.  
Political protest in comparison to conventional forms of political participation is a rather 
fluent concept. Its capture poses several hindrances. Although the general public is 
confronted with protest on a daily basis, its timely, spatial and thematic dimensions are 
often contingent and cannot be described and therefore analyzed as easily as many other 
social and economic developments or conventional participation forms, such as voting 
patterns.30 Consequently, the operationalization of political protest requires a stringent 
                                           
 
28 Barnes 1979: 42ff. 
29 Norris 2002: 211. 
30 Rucht 2001: 7. 
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and precise systematization, bearing in mind that complete captures of all possible protest 
events, even if they are limited in time and space, are elusive. Especially when it comes to 
questions such as the aim of a special protest action or the actual number of participants, 
vague and varying responses can be found depending on the source of information 
consulted. Nevertheless, trends will always remain visible and the researcher will be able 
to filter the most important information as long as he uses reliable and recognized 
sources. For Koopmans, the problem of imperfect sources when analyzing political protest 
is not possible to be solved completely. However, ―it should be stressed that bias as such 
is not always a real problem as long as we are not interested in any ‗absolute‘ truth and 
as long as the bias is systematic‖.31 Accordingly, the research on protest action offers a 
wide range of tools that facilitate the concept‘s operationalization.  
The method of protest event analysis has proven to be one of the main utensils for 
protest research in the last decades.32 As mentioned above, the media are indispensable 
for the envisioning of political protest. In the course of the evolution of protest research, 
newspapers have proven to be the best source of information when it comes to tracing 
protest action. Although Koopmans argues that newspapers have become the preferred 
source for most protest researchers, he admits that it was a ―negative choice‖. This 
means picking the best of all relatively problematic sources, since all sources are circled 
by certain disadvantages.33 This is due to the fact that official data on protest activities 
are lacking for the most part or, when available, are subject to equivocal or biased 
selection and categorization that often misfit scientific concepts. Moreover, official data is 
often itself based on media coverage. Archives, such as police reports and the like, are on 
the one hand often subject to bias and on the other hand frequently hard to access due 
to admission limitations or temporal restrictions.34 One last option – direct participatory 
observation and questioning – should be ruled out for the simple reasons of unfeasibility if 
the research is based on national or even cross-national phenomena, like the one that will 
be conducted in this paper.35  
As has become clear, newspaper analysis has distinctive superiority over other options to 
trace political protest. To begin with, newspapers present daily reports over a broad range 
of societal facts and phenomena. Newspapers are abundantly available and easier to 
                                           
 
31 Koopmans 1998: 93. 
32 Almeida/Lichtbach 2000: 250. 
33 Koopmans 1998: 91. 
34 Koopmans 1998: 92; Maney/Oliver 2001: 165ff. 
35 Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 77. 
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access, to save and to analyze than television or radio reports. Moreover, reliable and 
established newspapers are not as superfluous as internet sources and can be narrowed 
down more easily. Further, in contrast to internet sources, newspapers ―or at least those 
‗quality‘ papers with an educated readership‖36, are believed to maintain their credibility 
due to the competition on the information market and are supposed to cover significant 
events accurately.37  
Newspaper based protest event analysis will thus be used in this study as the main 
research method for the dependent variable. As already mentioned in the introduction, 
empirically protest events analyses date back to the initial studies of political protest – the 
1960s and 1970s.38 Long-term cross-country studies have been conducted by Ted Robert 
Gurr, who was focusing on the relative deprivation theory and the study of collective 
violence. A bulk of research was produced based on the data of the World Handbook on 
Political and Social Indicators that has gathered protest data for the period from the 
1960s until the 1980s. Charles Tilly has developed a long-term study of political protest 
for several countries, focusing on strikes and collective violence. Moreover, research on 
social movements highly related to protest research has been widely accompanied by the 
methods of protest event analysis.39 Similarly to the World Handbook, the Cross-National 
Time Series Data Archive initiated by Robert Bates covers annual data for a range of 
countries from 1815 to the present.40 Interestingly, all of these studies and long-term 
research projects have focused on the use of common newspaper data. However, for the 
most part they have been relying on The New York Times Index or the analysis of other 
newspapers in the English language that are to be found within this or other online 
archives. This means that relying on such databases offers no advantage over an own 
newspaper based protest event analysis. Hence, it only remains to be determined what 
kind of protest event analysis shall be chosen. 
Deciding on the method of the research at large depends on the research question and 
the object of study. Protest event analysis in the recent decades was mainly applied to 
social movement studies. Therefore, it can be distinguished on which side of a protest the 
protest event analysis is eager to focus. On the one hand, there is the external cognitive 
                                           
 
36 Koopmans 1998: 93. 
37 Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 89. 
38 Rucht 2001: 13ff. 
39 Rucht/Koopmans/Neidhardt 1998: 10ff.  
40 Knoll/Herkenrath 2009: 131. The Cross-National-Time Series Data Archive can be requested under: 
http://www.databanksinternational.com/. Unfortunately, it is liable to payment and could not be used in the 
present study for reasons explained above. 
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interest, reflecting the visible part of the protest event, such as the number of protesters 
or the timing of their action. On the other hand, there is the internal cognitive interest 
that centers on the aims and the meaning of the protest as well as its internal dynamics.41 
The object of interest proliferated by the research question is why political protest occurs 
in the first place and not its qualitative characteristics such as internal dynamics. 
Therefore, this study will focus on the external factors of political protest – so called hard 
facts. Hard facts are genuine aspects of protest events: timing, locality, number of 
participants, action form and the like. Soft facts refer to the internal motivation of 
participants. Newspapers are commonly recognized to reliably report on hard facts, 
whereas soft facts are rather subject to objective assessment of the journalist.42 A similar 
differentiation follows the quantitative/qualitative divide in protest event analysis. 
Whereas quantitative measurement focuses on hard facts for the estimation of the degree 
of mobilization, qualitative analysis prefers to look at soft facts of a particular protest 
event or a series of events. A further differentiation is given by the scaling of qualitative 
versus quantitative events. While the former can be measured with the nominal scale 
only, the latter can be depicted with the ordinal, interval, or ratio scale which allows for 
the ―counting‖ of protest events and the counting of their characteristics in turn 
facilitating their comparability.43 In order to quantify the dependent variable of this study, 
fixed indicators for the degree of political protest shall be established. For the 
measurement of the degree of political protest Kolb uses two sets of indicators. The first 
is the extent of protest mobilization, encompassing the number of protest events and the 
time span of those events. The second is the intensity of protest mobilization that 
illuminates the properties of the given protest event: the disruptiveness of the protest 
form, whether it was legal or illegal and violent or non-violent, and the size of the protest 
event measured by the number of participants.44 To this categorization, the timing of the 
protests will be added in this study because it is important for the research question if the 
protests have occurred as a direct response to anti-crisis. This ensures the analysis of 
protests that actually were protests against governmental anti-crisis measures and not 
protests against other issues.  
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Unifying Kolb‘s account of measures for political protest and the study‘s own 
considerations, the following indicators shall be operationalized and applied while testing 
the dependent variable: 
1. timing of political protest 
2. time span of the political protest 
3. number of participants 
4. form of political protest. 
The separation of protests according to their dimension in protests that circle around the 
thresholds of 1.000, 10.000 or 100.000 participants is visible in empirical studies. 
However, this is not useful for a comparative study, because the numbers have to be put 
in relation to the total population that highly varies between countries. Therefore, in the 
case study of this particular research, the percentages of the numbers of protestors will 
be related to the total population, after which the countries‘ percentages shall be merely 
compared on a linear scale. 
Having operationalized the dependent variable (DV), it is crucial to disclose the method of 
data collection for the dependent variable since it was pointed out above that data on 
political protest are not easily found in country statistics or records, let alone statistical 
databases. As already mentioned earlier in this section, the dependent variable shall be 
assessed deploying an autonomous newspaper-based protest event analysis.  
Protest event analyses are centered on the conventional content analyses. A content 
analysis per definition is an empirical method aiming at a systematic and intersubjectively 
comprehensive description of the content and the formal characteristics of messages.45 It 
embraces a variety of different single methods46 with their common trait being the 
appraisal of the content of various communicative processes under distinctive 
perspectives as well as the provision of quantitative and qualitative facets of the 
content.47 The original content analysis focused on quantifiable aspects of the content of 
texts, which is exactly what this research aims to do. Usually, content analysis is 
connected to a complicated and cost-intensive analysis of texts and is often conducted 
with the help of electronic tools such as content analysis software. The common 
procedure for content analyses is first the formation of hypotheses, the definition of the 
main unit of analysis and the universe/population of analysis (newspapers or texts that 
will be used). Second, from the universe a sample is derived. Following this method, a 
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system of categories is developed for the coding procedure of the main concepts. After 
this theoretical phase, pre-tests are accomplished, followed by the actual process of 
coding. The coded content is thereupon scaled or differentiated to advance the content‘s 
comparability. Subsequently, the data derived from the coding are evaluated and can be 
interpreted.48 The issues of reliability of the coders and the validity of the content that has 
been measured play an important role in standard content analysis. Reliability on the one 
hand refers to intercoder reliability – the consistency between several coders coding the 
same text – and intracoder reliability – the consistency between the same coder coding 
the same text after a certain time interval. If the categories are clearly defined, 
irregularities should be low. Validity is given as soon as data is measured that confirms 
the researcher‘s concept of reality and his definition of it.49 
As already mentioned, the method of research is closely connected to the researches‘ 
object. Therefore, a closer look at the unit of analysis developed in this study is necessary 
prior to the development of the precise measurement of the concepts. The study‘s unit of 
analysis, its dependent variable, is the degree of anti-crisis measures political protest. 
Hereby, not any random political protest is accounted for, but only political protest that 
might have occurred in reaction to anti-crisis measures that have been implemented 
between 2008 and 2010.50 The four indicators of the degree of political protest stated 
above have to be traced from a content analysis of newspaper reports. Thus, several 
coding categories will have to be accounted for when analyzing the sample of the news 
reports. 
Another constraint to the measurement, in particular in relation to the selection of the 
source and the sampling procedure, follows from the level of analysis. The level of 
analysis can be local, regional, national or cross-national and therefore influences the 
choice of media for the analysis. The level of analysis in this study is cross-national since 
the reaction to anti-crisis measures in the countries hit hardest by the crisis will be 
considered. This cross-national source for the analysis has to be a news source that 
covers at least the whole of the European Union. Rucht and Ohlenmacher have 
established four criteria for the optimum form of data collection. The sources have to be 
(1) continuous, which means that they cover the entire time period of analysis, (2) have 
to deploy a steady interest in the unit of analysis, (3) the filter for the source cannot be 
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too selective to allow for the needed variance and (4) the source should be easily 
accessible.51 The news sources that fulfill these criteria are limited. In principle, these are 
quality newspapers or news agencies that regard not only national, but transnational 
issues and in addition are issued in the English language. The latter has the pragmatic 
reason of comparability and the linguistic abilities of the researcher. The first of Ruchts 
and Ohlenmacher‘s criteria are fulfilled by almost all major national newspapers that have 
up to 2008 garnered some reputation and are issued in the English language. As has 
become obvious above, most of the protest event analysis carried out so far was based 
on quality newspapers such as The New York Times that have existed for a long time and 
cover a broad range of international news. The New York Times, however, bears a slight 
bias in favor of Northern America and thus should not be used when analyzing protest in 
the European Union. When focusing on the EU, European news sources shall be favored. 
Turning to the second criterion, it shall be assumed for all major news sources in Europe 
that they have upheld a steady interest in the implications of the recent economic and 
financial crisis throughout the period 2008 until 2010.  
As has been elaborated above, competition forces major newspapers to report on the 
most important and ―newsworthy‖ events. The financial crisis definitely was such an 
event. It has had and still has major implications for all countries in Europe, even those 
that were spared its harshest implications, because it has a high overall impact on the 
common European market.52 For the third criterion – the selectivity of the sources‘ filter – 
two pre-conditions have already been established: the importance of cross-national 
coverage and the availability of the source in the English language. In a further step it has 
to be reassured that the news source is not nationally biased. Thus, only newspapers with 
an extensive coverage on international issues and major international news agencies 
apply. Moreover, they have to be easily accessible for the researcher according to the last 
of Rucht and Ohlenmacher‘s criterion. The last condition will be assured for in this study 
due to free access to the LexisNexis Academic database. LexisNexis Academic is an 
internet-based host of news and commercial data. It owns a large archive of many major 
national and international newspapers, journals and news agency material as well as 
other documents related to politics, economy, finance and law. Its accessibility is 
                                           
 
51 Rucht/Ohlenmacher 1992: 89. 
52 This might seem a bit too confident at the first sight, but one has to keep in mind that Rucht and 
Ohlenmacher have established their criteria also considering the possible research on minor events and 
societal incidents which at some point might have lost or never have gained medial interest. 
                                   Julia Simon: Political Protest During Economic Crises 
 
24 
restricted to paying private and commercial customers as well as academics.53 It has 
increasingly developed into a popular media source for protest analysis and has been 
deployed in numerous studies.54 Within the LexisNexis Academic archive, the search in an 
extensive database is provided for with the tools of online analysis. One of the 
advantages of LexisNexis Academic is the possibility of choosing a combination of key 
words, which are then being searched for in the sample picked from the sources universe. 
Another clear advantage is the abundance of sources and their long temporal coverage. 
Moreover, according to Fan, ―although the basic elements of the search commands are 
simple, complex thoughts can be expressed by combining groups of words‖.55 So called 
Boolean search criteria can be applied in LexisNexis Academic, meaning that texts can be 
searched for different terms describing the same or similar phenomena with the 
combination of the most important terms used for these concepts.56 The exact terms and 
key words for the underlying political protest analyses will be depicted in the case study. 
Combining the third and fourth criterion of Rucht and Ohlenmachers categorization, for 
this particular case study, news agency articles, and especially the news articles issued by 
the news agency Agence France Presse, shall be favored. To begin with, all news issued 
by Agence France Presse during 2008-2010 are available via LexisNexis Academic, which 
means that the forth of Rucht and Ohlenmachers criteria are fulfilled. Secondly, articles by 
Agence France Presse will be preferred to major European newspapers such as the Irish 
Times or the Herald Tribune, also available via LexisNexis Academic, due to its rather 
international and less biased character. News issued by news agencies tend to be less 
partial than articles in newspapers, because an objective opinion plays a minor role in 
common newspapers. News agencies‘ articles focus on the strict reporting of events and 
only to a very limited extent on their evaluation. Regarding the study‘s object of interest – 
political protest in reaction to anti-crisis policies – and the conditions set up for the 
measurement of protest, the major interest lies in hard facts such as timing and the 
number of participants, which makes the opinion of journalists dispensable. News 
agencies‘ articles are far more appropriate here. Agence France Presse was chosen over 
other news agencies available via LexisNexis Academic because is counts as the major 
and eldest news agency covering events throughout the world. It is considered highly 
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reliable.57 Further, it includes the whole time period at consideration and does not use an 
overly narrow filter. Summing up, Agence France Presse fulfills all criteria submitted by 
Rucht and Ohlenmacher. 
Having explored the dependent variable the study now turns to the theoretical 
underpinning which is supposed to produce the independent variables needed for the 
analysis of deviation in protest against anti-crisis measures. 
2.  Political Participation and Political Protest - 
Theoretical Embedment 
In part 2 the object of analysis was defined conceptualized and operationalized to a full 
extent. In order to examine it in a case study it needs to be backed up by a theoretical 
net that illuminates the emergence of political protesting. Accordingly, any reasonable 
research in political science needs to be embedded in a wider theoretical framework in 
order to produce a proper context for the following explanation of its relevancy. It is a 
necessity for any question or phenomenon that at the first sight might seem either hard 
to explain or rather trivial to be placed along the lines of the overall theoretical research 
on this subject. Theories are ―a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which 
facts matter and which do not‖.58 Moreover, they represent a starting point from which to 
depart when looking for a theoretical substantiation of the matter at consideration.  
Research on political participation and political protest is conducted in the field of political 
sociology which represents a cross-section from politics to sociology. It combines research 
on the micro (individual) and meso- (societal) level with the macro- (state) level. It shall 
be shown in this section which most important theories are at work in this field and how 
they are applied. The aim is to be able to filter those approaches best suited for this study 
in the course of the theoretical elaboration.  
The research on political participation in general and political protest in particular rests on 
a long tradition and has been mostly developed since the 1960s within the social and 
political sciences. One of the central questions of research on political participation has 
always been why some individuals, groups or whole societies participate politically by 
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going to a ballot box, by turning to a politician or participating in a demonstration.59 A 
question following directly from that is why some individuals, groups or whole societies 
participate politically to a higher extent than others. Every form of political participation, 
be it voting, campaigning, demonstration or rioting has been examined by many authors 
posing different theories and approaches on all three levels of analysis.60 However, the 
aim of this body of research is not to find an all-including explanation but ―to understand 
the relative importance of each of these factors―.61  
Norris distinguishes four different schools of political participation research. These are: (1) 
social modernization theories, (2) institutional accounts, (3) agency theories and at last 
(4) models incorporating the role of social resources and cultural motivation.62 Social 
modernization theories imply that social tendencies that accompany post-industrialization 
such as improved standards of living, rising education and changes in employability 
opportunities shift the set-up of post-industrial societies and herewith convert, modify or 
actually alleviate the political participation of citizens in those societies. All those changes 
are assumed to lead to higher and broader political participation, amongst others in 
political protest.63 Institutional accounts stress the possibilities that arise or fall with the 
institutional and constitutional build-up of countries. It is argued that the way in which 
electoral laws, party systems, alliance structures and other purely institutional factors are 
set up can influence the political participation of the countries‘ citizens. It is further 
hypothesized that changes in the institutional set-up can provide for changes in 
participatory behavior.64 Agency theories, as the term implies, concentrate on agencies 
such as parties, unions and other societal groups that are said to be able to mobilize 
individuals that partake in those agencies to rising participation. The mechanism at work 
here is the presumption that within those agencies individuals acquire the skills and 
knowledge needed for political engagement.65 At last, motivational theories stress factors 
like political interest and political trust that also connect the motivation of individuals to 
the resources at their disposal when explaining political participation.66  
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This initial insight into the field of participation research points out that the theories 
described can be arranged along the line of the levels of analysis. Whereas the 
modernization and the institutional accounts clearly focus on the macro-level, agency 
theory originates from meso-level explanations. Lastly, resource-based and motivational 
theories focus on the individual or micro-level of analysis. This differentiation will play a 
key role in the identification of the theoretical underpinning for this study. To this end, all 
four accounts shall be considered in more detail and be complemented with approaches 
that are missing in Norris‘s summary. Building on this theoretical body, an explanation for 
diverging political participation in protest action in times of crises will be developed and 
successively applied in a case study.  
The modernization approach was one of the first developed in the wake of the coming 
into being of political participation theory on the macro-level. It stresses that increased 
demands for more active public participation is based on social trends that came about 
with the transformation of Western societies from industrialized to post-industrialized 
ones. This transformation was accompanied by developments such as urbanization, a 
growing level of general education, the specialization of the workforce, especially the 
growing employability in the service sector, rising standards of living, the greater 
availability of media, bureaucratization, the development of the welfare state and so on.67 
All of this is considered to have a positive influence on a growing level of political 
participation. One participation concept related to modernization theory is Gurr‘s theory of 
relative deprivation. This formerly psychological concept was developed insofar as he 
explained political action in general and political protest and political violence in particular 
based on the subjective comprehension of an actor. This subjective comprehension is 
based on the discrepancy between his value expectations and capabilities against the 
current value position.68 As soon as the felt discrepancy becomes too large to bear, 
meaning that the relative deprivation intensifies, the individual becomes active and fights 
to close this subjective gap.69 In contrast to modernization theory, however, the relative 
deprivation theory is best located on the individual (micro-) level of analysis. 
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The second broad range of theories on political participation is the state structure or the 
institutional account.70 Several branches of this theory exist. What they all have in 
common is the assumption that it is the way in which the structure of the state is set up 
that affects the level of participation in the respective society.71 Accordingly, it is those 
constitutional ―rules of the game, such as the type of majoritarian or proportional 
electoral system, the levels of competition and fragmentation in the party system, the 
degree of pluralism or corporatism in the interest-group system‖72 and so forth that shape 
the political engagement of citizens. One of those state structure models is the so-called 
political opportunities structure approach firstly developed by Eisinger in the 1970s. It 
states four major political opportunity structures –openness/closure of formal political 
access, stability/instability of political alignments, availability and strategic posture of 
potential alliance partners and finally political conflicts within and among elites – that 
facilitate or hinder political participation and political protest.73  
Turning to Norris‘s third main theoretical branch, mobilization or agency theories have to 
be explored. Agency theories focus on the role of mobilizing organizations that exist in 
any society. These can be political parties, trade and other unions, religious, community 
and voluntary groups. Within these organizations individuals are assumed to have the 
opportunity to develop contacts to other individuals, therefore contributing to the 
emergence of social networks. There, they then learn to cultivate skills useful for political 
participation.74 Putnam‘s theory on the importance of social capital for political 
mobilization particularly stands out of this body of research. According to Putnam, all 
kinds of voluntary social groups facilitate and assist the development of social networks, 
reinforce the growth of bonds and trust within this community. This generates the 
development of certain skills useful for participation and enhances the potential for as well 
as actual collective action.75 This theory branch is located at the meso- (societal) level of 
analysis.   
At last, Norris turns to resources-based and motivational theories. Although she considers 
them together, they are merely connected by their focus on the individual (micro-) level 
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and shall be separated in this overview. Cultural motivation theories stress the motivation 
of a single individual to become active in public affairs.76 Motivation here is divided 
between emotional, e.g. a sense of belonging or patriotism, and instrumental motivation 
influenced by the perceived benefits of participation.77 In connection to the instrumental 
side of this theory stands the rational choice theory of political activism, to a large part 
developed by Olson. According to Olson, individuals act rationally and are motivated by 
their self-interest. Therefore, they would not contribute to political protest that aims to 
enhance collective goods (policies are seen as a collective good in this approach) unless 
they see a particular personal benefit.78 
Resources-based models have proven to be valid for the explanation of political 
participation. One concept that has followed from resource-based research, the 
socioeconomic status (SES) model, stands out very positively. It has been thoroughly 
studied and widely recognized and verified. The underlying argument of the SES-model is 
that education, occupation and income have a significant influence on all forms of political 
participation. According to scientists such as Verba, Nie, Schlozman, Brady and many 
more, a higher socioeconomic status leads to higher political participation in society due 
to the fact that citizens become more aware of their surrounding world, internalize the 
norms of civic engagement and develop skills useful for participation.79  
All political participation models mentioned are allocated along the lines of the levels of 
analysis shown in table 1. This overview is given in order facilitate the selection of the 
ones best eligible for the development of the study‘s research design. 
Table 1: Allocation of political participation theories 
Individual/micro-level Societal/meso-level State/macro-level 
Rational Deprivation 
approach 
Rational Choice approach  
SES-Model  
Motivational approaches 
Agency theory 
Putnam‘s Social Capital 
theory 
Modernization theory 
Institutional theory - 
Political Opportunity 
Structure approach 
Source: own depiction. 
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Considering modernization theories which are located at the macro-level, their limits can 
be spotted in the rather immense abstraction of the concept. Moreover, the abundance of 
possible factors of influence leads to the assumption that some of them could also point 
to an inverse causality than the linear one from modernization towards more political 
participation. Likewise, empirical evidence on the validity of the modernization concept is 
rather limited and its reduction to Western societies is obsolete, making the concept futile 
for the study at hand.80 Moreover, this approach has proven to be best applicable for the 
explanation of conventional political participation such as voting and is thus less useful for 
the study of political protest.81 
Gurr‘s theory on relative deprivation leading to higher participation rates poses several 
hindrances for its operationalization. First of all, it is only subject to post-hoc explanations, 
due to the main reason that thresholds predicting from which point of relative deprivation 
an individual will be ready to engage politically are missing in the theory. Secondly, the 
subjective assessment of one‘s relative deprivation is highly difficult to operationalize. It 
would have to be based on opinion polls and questionnaires but still would bear the bias 
of subjective comprehension of deprivation, making it hardly comparable. These 
methodological obstacles eliminate the relative deprivation approach for a more narrow 
analysis in this study.  
The motivational approach on the individual level faces similar hindrances. It is hard to 
retrace individual motivation, especially its emotional side with measurable and 
comparable scales. Feelings such as patriotism can be expressed and measured in too 
many ways. Beyond that, the instrumental side of motivation theory, similar to the 
modernization approach, was rather applied to the analysis of voting and other 
conventional behavior.82 
Agency theories, amongst others Putnam‘s account, have proven particularly useful when 
explaining conventional participation.83 Due to their concentration on the meso-level they 
tend to better explain political participation along structured and organized lines. Since 
this study focuses on episodic participation in political protest and not on long-term 
political participation accounts on the meso-level will be disregarded, or rather implied as 
causal mechanisms. 
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The rational choice approach was located at the individual level. Being a simplistic but 
slim theory, the rational choice and collective action approach has been extensively 
studied but for the most part has become the subject of concept amelioration.84 Like 
modernization approaches it has most widely been used for explanations of conventional 
political engagement, especially voting behavior and is thus also neglected in this study.  
The SES-model on the individual level and the political opportunity structure model on the 
macro-level that after a first sight have proven to be most useful for this study remain to 
be analyzed in more detail in the following chapters. This decision is based on the fact 
that these theories originate from different levels of analysis, providing the research with 
the required diversity. Moreover, both accounts have proven especially useful for the 
study of unconventional participation and are until this day widely used in national as well 
as cross-national comparative political participation research. Both shall be looked at more 
deeply to legitimate the preference of these approaches for the current analysis. Thus, 
the next chapter turns to the conceptualization and operationalization of the independent 
variables that find their theoretical base in the SES-model and the POS approach. 
3. The Socioeconomic Status Model and the Political 
Opportunity Structure Approach – Specification of 
the Study’s Research Design 
In the preceding chapter various possible theories pointing to different expressions of the 
dependent variable political protest were presented. Two concepts were chosen to be 
expanded in depth due to their most appropriate applicability to the dependent variable: 
the SES-model and the POS approach. From each of them an independent variable shall 
be traced for which an underlying hypothesis will be formulated. Subsequently, the 
hypotheses will be examined for their validity in explaining political protest action. 
According to a positivist research design, each of the two independent variables has to be 
operationalized through indicators that are measurable and comparable. In order to carry 
out the measurement, instruments and sources of data will be depicted, as accomplished 
for the dependent variable in part 2.  
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3.1  The Socioeconomic Status – Conceptualization and 
Operationalization of the IV I  
The basic premise of the socioeconomic status model is that ―[N]o matter how class is 
measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely to 
participate in politics than lower-class persons‖.85 According to this model it is primarily 
education, the income as well as the occupational status that influence political 
participation.86 All three factors are to a high extent internally correlated, but can be 
measured separately and show their highest explanatory ability when considered 
together. The reasons for a higher participation of citizens that are socioeconomically 
better situated are various. Amongst others, it is implied that they possess better 
possibilities for political participation, communicate more about politics and have 
internalized the norms and preconditions needed for political participation.87 
Methodologically, causal mechanisms ―explain how a hypothesized cause creates a 
particular outcome in a given context‖.88 They represent a link between the independent 
and dependent variables and are constructed in order to ―open the black box of law like 
probability statements that simply state the concurrence or correlation of certain 
phenomena or events‖.89 Thus, the underlying question for causal mechanisms is not if or 
why, but how. They can appear at any level of analysis and can at the same time explain 
several causal chains. The initial SES-model was extended by Verba and his colleagues to 
the so-called Civic Voluntarism model. It was by and large developed by Verba, Brady, 
Schlozman and Lehmann. They present a refinement of the SES-model assuming that 
individuals with higher education, income and better jobs also dispose over larger 
resources such as time, money and civic skills that they learn in their family, job or in 
their free time.90 Again, these factors facilitate political participation. The factors that 
Verba and colleagues consider additional or intervening indicators of political participation 
in this study will be regarded as causal mechanisms that were actually already implied in 
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the basic model. Therefore, in the operationalization of the model, this study sticks to the 
basic premises of the SES model. 
In view of that, the causal mechanisms at work in the SES-model need to be reflected in 
order to comprehend what characteristics lead to higher participation amongst 
socioeconomically better situated citizens. According to the initial model, the mechanisms 
or as Verba and Nie call them ―connective links‖ at work here can be summarized as 
follows: (1) the social environment in which citizens with a socioeconomically higher 
status are more likely to be involved in organizations and be surrounded by other citizens 
who participate politically, (2) the availability of resources (time and money) and skills 
needed for participation, (3) the perception of being politically useful and the sense of 
contributing to the community, (4) the psychological involvement in politics meaning the 
expressed and felt interest in politics, which in turn is based on (5) the higher grade of 
information about politics. All these factors facilitate political participation or at least make 
it more probable for the individual. 
Despite the strong and often proved rigor of the model, its applicability differs between 
different participation forms. So far it was verified to be least suitable for the explanation 
of voting behavior, whereas it was more suitable for other conventional and especially 
unconventional participation forms.91  
In a nutshell, the correlation between the socioeconomic status and participation in 
political protest can be summarized in the first study hypothesis: 
HI: the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of individuals in a 
country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this 
country. 
The hypothesis clarifies that this study needs to consider the socioeconomic status from 
an aggregate perspective if it wants to conduct a proper cross-national comparison. When 
comparing political participation in different countries based on the SES-model, cross-
country studies based on the comparison of the socioeconomic status have been 
conducted on the aggregated micro-level. Comparison was made possible through the 
operationalization of such units of measure as median educational level, income per 
capita and occupational status. Using aggregate data, studies of political development 
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have found a close relationship between the rate of political participation and the 
aggregate socioeconomic status.92  
The indicators with which educational level, income per capita and the employment status 
can be measured in this study will be extracted from the Eurostat database and the 
Human Development Index (HDI) measures. Eurostat is a Directorate-General (DG), an 
administrative branch of the European Commission. Eurostat was established in 1953 in 
order to collect and provide comparable statistical cross-country data on the main 
indicators from the spheres of politics, economy, population, health, environment and so 
forth to the public.93 Eurostat will be used in this study to measure the aggregate 
educational and occupational level. It will be shown when it comes to the control variables 
that the case selection will only account for countries in the European Union, making the 
use of Eurostat as a source legitimate. The HDI is a summary composite index introduced 
in 1990 for almost all countries in the world measuring the development along three basic 
lines: health, knowledge and income.94 Correspondingly, the income per capita will be 
measured with HDI data. This study adopts an additive comprehension of the composition 
of the indicators that make up the independent variables. It means that the single 
indicators will be considered together in their symbiosis. 
The measure for the median education level in a country95 that was chosen from the 
overall measure on education and training from the Eurostat data base is total population 
having completed at least upper secondary education. Hereby, the dispersion of the 
population aged 25 to 64 along this indicator in percent is considered.96 It will be assumed 
that countries with a higher level of at least secondary education have a higher level of 
median education and thus are more eager to participate in political protest. 
The second indicator – income per capita level in a country – will be operationalized using 
HDI. Comparing income distribution across countries poses the need to consider it in 
terms of purchasing power parity97 in order to account for differences in living standards. 
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Since Eurostat does not provide such data, HDI is preferred at this point. The item income 
index (gross national income per capita) measures the gross national income per capita 
with the 2005 purchasing power parity equalized in dollars and ―expressed as an index 
using a minimum value of $100 and observed maximum value over 1980-2011‖98. It is 
favorable because it implies that the higher the rate of the item, the higher the aggregate 
income level in the country. What makes this variable more valuable than other variables 
measuring income for instance including raw data on income in a certain currency is that 
it actually takes account of the differences in the standards of living between different 
countries by referring to purchasing power parity. 
The last indicator is the occupational status of citizens. Eurostat data only deliver raw 
numbers of people occupied in different vocational fields such as legislators, senior 
officials or managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, service workers and the like. In 
order to produce comparable data, these raw numbers will have to be weighted in 
relation to the number of the overall active population. The data on the latter factor are 
also given in the Eurostat database.99 Hence, the indicator distribution of employment 
status will be generated from these two measures.  
Summing up, the following indicators shall be used for the operationalization of the 
concept of socioeconomic status on the aggregate individual level: 
1. total population having completed at least upper secondary education  
2. income index (gross national income per capita) 
3. distribution of employment status as % of the active population. 
The conceptualization and operationalization of the independent variable will be applied in 
chapter 6, when the cases for the case study will be chosen.  
Accounting for the micro-level of analysis, the SES concept disregards the macro-level, 
which also plays an important role when explaining political participation behavior. 
Applying the SES-model as the basis for this study‘s research it needs to be looked upon 
on the macro-level to analyze additional factors that facilitate political participation, 
because single-variable explanations are often missing out crucial aspects.100 This being 
said, the expansion focusing on structural factors, the political opportunity structure, will 
be conducted in the next section. 
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3.2 The Political Opportunity Structure Model 
The SES-model presented in the previous chapter stems from the individual level of 
analysis. The second account shall be referred to the overarching political context of the 
state in which the individual resides and which is responsible for his opportunities to 
politically protest.  
The political opportunity structure model originates from state structure accounts as was 
laid out in part 3. First introduces by Eisinger in 1973 who analyzed riot behavior in 
America in the 1960s on the local level, it has been since then elaborated and changed by 
several authors in local, national and cross-national studies.101 In general, the POS of a 
country refers to ―the nature of resources and constraints external to the challenging 
group‖.102 In a broader definition by one of the most important analysts of POS, Kitschelt, 
these are ―comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements 
and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of 
protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others‖.103  
In order to make the concept of POS comprehensible, its main components have to be 
considered. It is implied in the concept that political opportunity structures apply to 
various levels of access to main political actors.104 The main factors that have been 
established and agreed to in the course of the research on POS are (1) the formal political 
institutional structure, indicating the openness or closure of formal access to politicians 
and thus furthering or hindering the perception of one‘s ability to influence political 
outcomes, (2) informal strategies or posture of elites, denoting integrative or exclusive 
elites, (3) the configuration of power suggesting either a divided or a united elite and 
distinguishing between elites with inner conflicts or conflicts between elites and finally (4) 
the political output structure pointing to stabilities or instabilities in political alignments.105 
Whereas the first factor exemplifies the formal access to political institutions and actors, 
the latter three are based on rather informal access. Kriesi similarly describes the first 
factor as the institutional structure (in the sense of North, see chapter 3.) of a political 
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system, whereas the factors (2) through (4) exemplify informal strategies and the 
configuration of power among the actors of the political system.106  
It is fundamental for this study to identify those POS-factors that have the highest 
explanatory power for the research question. Since the unit of analysis is protest 
mobilization against anti-crisis measures, it is not the outcome of the protest that is 
analyzed but the mere question whether protest has taken place or not.107 Johnston 
shows an explicit divide between the study of the occurrence of protest and the research 
comprised under the term outcomes.108 It is the formal institutional structure of states – 
the most stable of all POS factors – that plays a central role for the conceptualization and 
operationalization of political opportunity structure in this research.109 As several students 
of POS have pointed out, informal strategies and configurations of power among the 
actors of the political system play a higher role when it comes to the analysis of the 
outcomes of political mobilization and the ability of challengers to actually establish their 
demands.110 For political mobilization to take place, however, formal institutional 
conditions are more important. Accordingly, Kriesi draws a line between procedural and 
substantial success of political mobilization. Procedural success means the actual coming 
into being of mobilization and substantial mobilization means success of the mobilized 
action to influence amend or introduce a policy.111  
What then, is precisely implied by the formal institutional structure and how can this 
concept be operationalized? At the center of the concept of the formal institutional 
structure lies the degree of openness or closure of the political system of a state. A 
system is open when political decisions take various steps and include several actors or 
groups of actors before policies are implemented. While ―getting things done‖ such a 
system also succeeds in involving as many actors as possible in the policy process.112 
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However, there are two models that assume an influence of openness of a state on 
political protest. The first is the initial linear model which stresses that if the system is 
closed, then protest is high and it declines steadily with rising openness. The second 
model is curvilinear pointing out that in both highly open and highly closed systems only 
low protest occurs. In-between the two poles, protest raises to a certain point, after 
which protest declines again towards both ends of the curve (figure 1). Thus, mixed 
systems bear the highest numbers of protest. Empirically, the curvilinear model was 
proven to be most appropriate and thus will be used in this study.113 Provided that only 
democracies are considered in the empirical analysis, and none of the systems to be 
analyzed can be viewed as completely closed, an interesting theoretical puzzle occurs. 
Applying the assumptions of the curvilinear correlation, the curve is subject to a partition 
in democratic and non-democratic systems that occur in the form of a threshold. This 
threshold is drawn in the middle of the curve in figure 1. This nuance leads to the 
following second hypothesis:  
HII: the higher the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure of a country, 
the lower the degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures in this country. 
 
Figure 1: Linear and curvilinear connection between POS and political protest 
 
Source: own depiction based on Opp 2009. 
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There are several indicators pointing to the openness or closure of the formal institutional 
structure of a state.114 In this study, Kitschelt‘s account shall be favored when 
conceptualizing the formal institutional structure. He delineates the following indicators: 
(1) the separation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary and 
especially the capacity of the legislature to develop policies independently of the 
executive. Kitschelt incorporates this indicator on democratic terms ―because a legislature 
is by definition an electorally accountable agent and is therefore much more sensitive to 
public demands, whereas only the uppermost positions in the executive are subject to 
such direct public pressure‖.115 The second indicator is (2) the number of parties and 
factions which influence the formulation of policies. ―The larger this number, the more 
'centrifugal' a political system tends to be and the more difficult it is to confine electoral 
interest articulation to the 'cartel' of entrenched interests that is represented by the 
established, bureaucratized parties‖.116 The third and last indicator is (3) the pattern of 
intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch. When the system is 
pluralistic it allows for the incorporation of different opinions in the decision-making 
procedure, when it is corporatist, it allows only for the incorporation of some aggregate 
interests formed within main societal groups. As already stated when describing the 
indicators of IV I, the three indicators will be grasped additively.  
Having formulated the second hypothesis and having established the indicators of the 
POS the question remains which direction the causality from POS to political participation 
will take. Both options are possible. The causality implied in most research is that the 
more open the institutional structure, the higher the participation of the citizens. 
However, considering protest action, the causality could also point to the inverse direction 
following from the assumption that the more the civil society feels restricted by the state, 
the more it will be eager to make its voice heard. The latter is implicitly assumed in this 
study‘s hypothesis. Analogue to the SES-model, the question of the causal mechanism at 
work in this logical chain arises. How does a better political opportunity structure lead to 
extended participation in political protest? The question of the causal mechanism shall be 
verified in the case study. So far, the established causality is assumed, leading to the 
proposition that the higher the separation of powers between the legislative, the 
executive and the judiciary, the higher the number of political parties involved in the 
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legislative process117, the more pluralist the political system, the more open the political 
opportunity structure and thus the lower the degree of political protest.  
In order to quantify the degree of openness of a state, each of the indicators presented 
has to be considered separately. Turning firstly to the division of powers in a state, the 
ability of the legislature to develop policies independently of the executive is quantified 
distinctly from the independence of the judiciary. The Comparative Political Data Set III 
(CPDS III) established by Klaus Armingeon et al. will be used to assess the first indicator. 
The CPDS III is a compilation of political and institutional annual data for 35 countries 
(OECD-members and/or EU-member countries). It ranges from 1990 to 2009 and 
combines data from the Comparative Political Data Sets I and II.118 Under the wide range 
of variables coded under the topic ―institutions‖ in the dataset, the indicator executive 
legislative relations according to Lijphart is used. Lijphart distinguishes between 
democracies with an executive dominance versus democracies in which the relation 
between the executive and the legislative is rather balanced according to several criteria 
that he stipulates.119 From this distinction originates the following typology of the 
executive-legislative types of balance arrayed from most to least open: parliamentary 
systems; semi-presidential systems dominated by parliament; semi-presidential systems 
dominated by president; presidential systems; hybrid systems. This CPDS III indicator will 
be tested for the separation of powers in the case study.  
Turning to the independence of the judiciary in a political system, the indicator of judicial 
independence will be operationalized. It will be drawn from the Economic Freedom of the 
World reports. The Economic Freedom of the World reports present data on several topics 
concerning economic development and are issued by the Fraser Institute for 141 
countries, in some instances dating as far back as 1970.120 The indicator judicial 
independence is a measure taken from the Global Competitiveness Report and 
incorporated in the Economic Freedom of the World reports. It was compiled from 
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answers to the question: ―Is the judiciary in your country independent from political 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?‖.121 
The next indicator, the number of parties involved in the legislative process, can also be 
measured using the CPDS III. In this study, parties that dispose of seats in the country‘s 
legislative body (the parliament) shall be equalized with parties involved in the legislative 
process. Therefore, a variable from CPDS III that scales the effective number of parties 
on the seats level shall be used122. The effective number of parties in parliament shows 
the number of parties in a parliament weighted by their relative strength. This allows not 
only for the counting of the parties in a parliament but at the same time for consideration 
of the fractualization in the parliament which is what this operationalization is looking 
for.123 Thus, the higher the effective number of parties, the more centrifugal the system 
and the more it is subject to influences from outside.  
The last indicator of the variable degree of openness of a state is pluralism in the 
structure of the given state. On the one hand, this implies the question if people are 
consulted on the most important issues (e.g. changes in the constitution or the joining of 
international organizations) via a referendum and if they have the means and possibilities 
to call for a referendum or a popular initiative. On the other hand, this indicator also 
comprises the differentiation in pluralist versus corporatist political systems. The latter 
means the involvement of popular representatives such as trade unions and other 
important peak organizations in the political procedures of the state, whereas the former 
does not account for such decision-making action.  
The first indicator here is drawn from the CPDS III database. The database contains three 
different data that account for referenda and popular initiatives. The first item identifies 
the existence or absence of a mechanism where specific amendments of the Constitution 
or a law need to be submitted to the people automatically and only are implemented 
when the people vote in favor of the proposition.124 The second item measures the 
popular veto as a non-required referendum that is triggered by so-called ―non-existing 
veto-players‖. With non-existing veto-players groups of citizens are implied.125 The last 
item is the possibility for non-existing veto-players (electors) in a state to trigger a 
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popular initiative which has to be brought to the decision of the people if they can collect 
enough support.126 
The second track of measurement of the indicator degree of plurality in a state will be 
grasped from the pair of opposites: pluralism and corporatism. Whereas pluralism refers 
to systems where societal power is not concentrated in the hand of a few organizations 
and thus is eligible to spontaneous and fluid influence, in corporatist systems ―interest 
groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies‖127. 
Here, the interest groups tend to be large in size but small in number, are often united in 
peak organizations and conduct regular consultations with the states‘ decision-makers.128 
Thus, corporatist systems are less flexible, which leads to the conclusion that they 
represent a less open state.129 If this causal mechanism is actually at work or not will be 
shown in the case study.  
The concept of corporatism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s and was revived since the 
end of the 1990s and 2000s with the emergence of new so called ―social pacts‖ in some 
countries.130 The operationalization of corporatism is a highly contested issue.131 
Kenworthy counts some 42 different measures of corporatism.132 To adjust this amplitude 
to this study in order to be able to make a slim but purposeful analysis, one such variable 
shall be considered that is adequate and sufficient for a study of this scope. Such a 
variable was extracted from the database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2010 (ICTWSS), issued by the 
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. The database covers a sample of 34 
countries a large amount of data. The item chosen from this rich database is routine 
involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic 
policy.133 It rates the countries on a level from 0 to 2 ranging from regular, irregular to no 
involvement. Using the combination of the first variable for the indicator pluralism in a 
state – the options of referenda and public initiatives – and the second variable – 
                                           
 
126 Ibid. The coding follows the pattern 1=yes; 0=no. 
127 Cristiansen et al. 2010: 22. 
128 Lijphart 1999: 172. 
129 This debate is paralleled by the debate on ―associative democracy‖ and the degree to which it is able or 
rather unable to include the whole society. 
130 Bocaro 2010: 2ff. 
131 For an overview see Woldendorp/Kemal 2008; Christiansen et al. 2009: 25ff.  
132 Kenworthy 2000: 36. 
133 Visser 2011: 13. The grade 2 means full concertation, regular and frequent involvement; 1 means partial 
concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement and 0 means nonconcertation, involvement is rare or 
absent. 
Julia Simon: Political Protest During Economic Crises                     43 
corporatism versus pluralism, it shall be assessed how pluralistic the considered states 
are.  
Having sorted out the main theoretical approaches for this study and having depicted 
their operationalization, it can be noted that all three levels of analysis are now covered. 
The dependent variable resides on the meso-level, the first independent variable is 
allocated on the aggregate micro-level and the second independent variable is located on 
the macro-level. This lends the study a fully-fledged concept. In order to conduct a 
thorough case study, the cases for closer analysis will be drawn from a body of possible 
cases that will be compared via their variance of the independent variables in the next 
chapter. Furthermore, prior to the selection on the IV, a pre-selection applying control 
variables will be accomplished. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Positivist Research Design and the Method of Comparative Case 
Study Research 
The employment of the positivist research design in this was already stressed in the 
introduction and in part 2. Hypotheses were formulated from the theories on political 
participation in the previous chapter. The following task is verifying them in a comparative 
case study.  
To materialize this kind of theory verification, it is crucial to carefully choose appropriate 
comparative cases along which the hypotheses can be tested. The universe of cases is on 
the one hand limited by the unit of analysis itself134 – political protest during the last 
financial and economic crisis meaning that only countries that were hit by the crisis can 
be accounted for. On the other hand it is constrained by the availability of data – in many 
countries ―accurate and timely publication of political, economic, and social data remains 
a luxury‖.135 This means that the research has to rely on a sample of countries carefully 
chosen to ensure a minimal selection bias. The goal is to indicate a sample that allows for 
the generalization of the results of the analysis. In addition, the cases have to designate a 
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variation along the variables that they are analyzed for (causal leverage).136 This implies a 
non-random, purposive selection. Gerring counts nine different methods of purposive case 
selection: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar and 
most different.137 All of them rest on at least one case; some require a minimum of two. 
These methods are used for small-N case selection procedures to be adopted in this 
study. Large-N selection procedures are rather related to randomized techniques. 
According to Woldendorp and Keman, choosing between a large-N and a small-N method 
is a trade-off between ―statistical explanation and thick description‖.138 A large-N study 
allows for the generation of empirical support or empirical disprove of a theory and 
reduces the selection bias of cases, whereas a small-N study implies an in-depth 
understanding of a case.139 A small-N study is preferred to a large-N study in the 
framework of this research because it allows for a strong test exposing first insights for 
the just recently developing research on civil society reaction to economic crises.140 
Nevertheless, a connection between a small-N case study and a large-N universe of cases 
is drawn from a large cases universe that the unit of analysis allows to consider by 
performing a pre-selection on the control and independent variables of the cases. This 
represents a combination of the statistical advantages of a large-N study with the 
advantages of a strong test via a small-N test by choosing two cases for a deeper insight 
from a large pool of countries that are determined initially.141  
To go back to Gerring‘s methods of case selection listed above it must be stressed that 
they are divided along the lines of the researcher‘s interest. They are either DV- or IV-
centered, or centered on both the dependent and the independent variable. DV-centered 
methods aim to explain a puzzling case but pose no preconditions for the independent 
variables, IV-centered methods are informed about the causes of outcomes, but have no 
information on those outcomes. Such selection methods are exploratory and usually aim 
to generate new hypotheses. DV-/IV-centered research on the contrary connects causes 
with outcomes and has the purpose of testing existing hypotheses.142 In this research, the 
latter approach will be applied.  
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Of the nine case selection methods, the extreme-case and the deviant-case methods are 
used for hypotheses-generation only. All other methods are used either for hypotheses-
testing or both hypotheses-testing and -generation. Gerring provides persuasive reasons 
to prefer the diverse-case technique of case selection. In his overview, the diverse 
method even gets ahead of the frequently used most-similar and most-different case 
selection methods due to the limitations of the latter.143 The main goal of the diverse-case 
method is to include the maximum of variance along both the dependent and the 
independent variables. Another advantage of the method is that the variance can be 
measured with both categorical and continuous indicators. Then, either both, high and 
low, extreme values on the study variables are included or those that correspond to 
certain thresholds established by the researcher are selected.144 This case-selection 
method thus matches best with the aims of this study.  
According to the diverse-case hypotheses-testing technique it is recommended to choose 
the cases in the first place on the highest variation of the independent variable: ―The 
‗extreme value on the IV‘ method of case selection argues (…) that cases that are atypical 
in their endowment with the independent variable teach us the most‖.145 Van Evera claims 
that a test that employs a case selected on the extreme values of the IV is the strongest 
test, allowing ruling out results that could stem from factors not included in the 
analysis.146 Given that two independent variables will be tested, at least four 
representative cases will be extracted on their variance on the independent variables to 
allow for a proper theory test, given that those extreme cases are given after the IV-test. 
The first case with a high degree of SES and a high degree of POS, the second case with 
a high degree of SES and a low degree of POS, the third case with a low degree of SES 
and a high degree of POS and the last case with a low degree of SES and a low degree of 
POS.  
Prior to the selection of the cases on their IV-characteristics, the universe of cases shall 
be tested for the control variables. Control variables (also called context or condition 
variables) are variables that frame given conditions and influence the impact that 
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independent variables have on the dependent variable.147 In a way, they can be described 
as the ―environment‖ of the unit of analysis.148 In empirical analyses, they have to be held 
constant for all cases, when causal relations are tested.149 Those control variables most 
vital for the comparison of political protest behavior against anti-crisis measures will be 
laid out in the next section. After an adjacent justification of the time period of the case 
study, the research will turn to the case selection according to the guidelines discussed in 
this paragraph. 
4.2 Control Variables - Concept and Operationalization 
To conduct a case selection on the independent variable for the case study, various pre-
steps have to be taken. A case universe which applies to the underlying research question 
has to be defined and controlled for. On the one hand, this case universe should 
preferably be as similar as possible given the comparability of the unit of the research – 
political protest against anti-crisis measures. On the other hand, it has to be as distinct as 
possible when it comes to the independent variables. In order to undertake these pre-
steps, control variables have to be formulated and accounted for.  
Control variables, as stated in part 5.1, are variables that have to be valid for all the cases 
that will be subject to the IV-case selection. Control variables for the study of political 
protest in reaction to anti-crisis measures in the course of the financial and economic 
crisis of 2008-2010 are thus predominantly of economical character. 
The first control variable thus refers to economic ties that develop in constructed regions 
or regions that have economically grown together over time or due to geographical or 
cultural proximity. Countries that are members of the European Union will be taken into 
account. These countries are tied together by strong economic bonds, a fact which is 
crucial in the face of an economic crisis. These ties have become even more visible in the 
course of the Euro-crisis that followed the initial world-wide financial crisis and is ongoing 
to the day of writing.150 
The second control variable is the degree with which countries of the EU were hit by the 
crisis. This choice follows a simple logical chain that presumes that in order to expect a 
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similar degree of political protest against anti-crisis measures the crisis has to have had a 
comparable impact in the countries. Bearing this in mind, the selected cases will have to 
be countries affected the most and to a similar degree by the crisis 2008-2010. This will 
become visible when comparing for the three most important economic indicators: 
1. GDP per capita growth 
2. unemployment rate 
3. inflation rate.  
Hereby, the preliminary selection will be drawn, picking countries that have gone through 
a recession within the time of the crisis. A recession is first and foremost classified by 
falling GDP over a period of two consecutive quarters.151 This is the strongest of the three 
indicators and will thus be conferred with the highest weight. Furthermore, strong 
economic damage due to the crisis will be implied as soon as the unemployment rate as 
well as the inflation rate has been significantly rising.152 All the three indicators will be 
traced via Eurostat. The quarterly GDP per capita growth data show the production 
activity of the residents and represents all goods and services produced minus the value 
of any goods or services used in their creation.153 The unemployment rate depicts the rate 
of unemployed people as a percentage of the whole labor force.154 Finally the inflation 
rate represents the annual average rate of change of the inflation in comparison to the 
previous year.155  
The third control variable that has to be accounted for in order to conduct a proper 
comparison is the actual anti-crisis measures that were taken to fight the consequences in 
the countries that were hit by the crisis. Anti-crisis measures can differ to a great extent – 
                                           
 
151 Campbell 2011. 
152 European Commission 2012c. 
153 ―Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices is the final result of the production activity of resident 
producer units (ESA 1995, 8.89). It is defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value 
of any goods or services used in their creation. Data are calculated as chain-linked volumes (i.e. data at 
previous year's prices, linked over the years via appropriate growth rates). Growth rates with respect to the 
previous quarter (Q/Q-1) are calculated from calendar and seasonally adjusted figures while growth rates with 
respect to the same quarter of the previous year (Q/Q-4) are calculated from raw data‖ (European 
Commission 2012d). 
154 ―Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force 
is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 
74 who were: a. without work during the reference week, b. currently available for work, i.e. were available 
for paid employment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week, c. 
actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to 
seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, 
three months‖ (European Commission 2012e). 
155 ―Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) are designed for international comparisons of consumer 
price inflation. HICP is used for example by the European Central Bank for monitoring of inflation in the 
Economic and Monetary Union and for the assessment of inflation convergence as required under Article 121 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam.‖ (European Commission 2012f). 
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they can be fiscal, monetary or a mix of both.156 Fiscal policy refers to taxation and public 
spending. It can either aim to increase economic activity via increased spending and 
decreased tax revenue, which leads to higher fiscal deficit. Or, fiscal policy can aim for a 
slower economy with a higher fiscal surplus by cutting spending and increasing tax 
revenue.157 Monetary policy focuses on measures to manage money supply by adjusting 
for interest rates or regulating the conduct of market operations or changing the reserve 
requirements of banks. Similarly to fiscal policy, it can be loose or tight, depending on the 
aims of the authorities (keeping the money supply steady, raising or reducing it).158 In 
times of crises, short-term as well as long-term fiscal and monetary policies can be 
conducted by governments in order to stabilize the outcomes of the crisis. Ditkiewicz and 
Gorzelak distinguish between three policy options for countries‘ crisis-solution: (1) the 
organization of large-scale public infrastructure programs in order to encourage domestic 
demand and relieve the fiscal strain of the banking system, (2) introduce austerity 
measures such as wage and employment reductions in the public sphere and cut public 
investment projects in order to restore the balance of public finance and (3) increase 
spending on the research and development of new technologies and other projects to rise 
the long-term competitiveness of the country.159 As they become detectable from the 
definition of financial and monetary policy options and from the categorization given by 
Ditkiewicz and Gorzelak, fiscal or austerity measures can be taken out on the shoulders of 
the people in a more direct and visible way than monetary policies because the latter 
affect financial institutions in the first place.  
In order to be able to compare protest reaction to anti-crisis measures by the civil 
societies, only countries that have issued anti-crisis policies that actually restrain the 
citizens – austerity measures – will be considered. In detail the following indicators will be 
looked at: 
1. wage cuts in the public sector 
2. cuts in public benefit spending 
3. increases in taxation. 
Due to a lack of an overarching source encompassing the austerity measures across the 
EU, various sources will have to be consulted. Gorzelak (2010a) offers a clear-cut 
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overview of the crisis, its implications and anti-crisis measures for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Vera Glassner (2010) provides a cross-European analysis of anti-
crisis measures in the public sector. Additional data will be traced from country-specific 
analyses and government publications.  
All variables that will be used in this study have been defined at this point and are listed 
in an overview in table 20 in the appendix.   
The case selection by means of control and independent variables will be carried out in 
part 6 of the study, after the elaboration of the time frame for the case study. 
4.3 Time Frame 
The time period selected for the study is highly constrained by the object of research. It 
refers to the recent global financial and economic crisis which has shown its first signs in 
the beginning of 2008.160 Worldwide, but also Europe-wide, economies started to recover 
from this heavy recession in 2010 which was by and large over by the end of that year.161 
Some European states, such as Italy, Spain, Greece and partly also Ireland have fallen 
victim to the following so-called ―Euro-crisis‖ beginning to appear in the course of 2010 
and at times combined with the initial crisis. However, in this study, a sharp line shall be 
drawn between these two crises. First and foremost stands the fact of the availability of 
data. Most statistical political and economic data are issued with a certain time lag, which 
would make the analysis of the trends in 2011/12 impracticable. Second, the fact that the 
Euro-crisis has hit only some of the European countries would highly limit the universe of 
cases for the crucial case selection. Third, the ―Euro-crisis‖ as against to the 2008-2010 
financial and economic crisis is far from being over at the time of writing leading to 
running the risk of preliminary assumptions that might not hold true when considering the 
whole time period of the crisis.  
It has to be stressed at this point that the author of the study is highly aware of the 
narrowness of the underlying time period of three years. This awareness will be embodied 
through a critical assessment of the study‘s results. However, this time restriction still is 
appropriate and sufficient for this research because the explanatory power of the study‘s 
results will only be applied to the time period at consideration and will be treated with 
great cautiousness. The results from this short-term analysis can therefore be used to 
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enlighten trends in protest behavior in times of harsh crises and be further applied to the 
analysis of protest behavior during other crises.  
5. Case Selection 
5.1 Pre-selection on the Control Variables 
As has already become clear in the preceding chapters, the case universe at the onset 
embraces all of the 27 countries that were members of the European Union between 2008 
and 2010 (CV I). These are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, as has been pointed out 
previously, not all of the countries of the EU were hit by the crisis with the same 
strength.162 To pick countries that suffered severe economic damage, the EU-states need 
to be further differentiated via the second and third control variable.  
In part 5.2 the indicators pointing to the economic damage of the crisis have been 
presented. The selection on the first indicator quarterly GDP per capita growth bears a 
country selection listed in table 2. Per definition only countries with more than two 
quarters of falling GDP rates will be included, leading to the drop out of Slovakia, Malta, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Sweden.  
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Table 2: Quarterly GDP per capital growth 2008 (08), 2009 (09), 2010 (10) 
Country/ 
Time 
08 
Q1 
08 
Q2 
08 
Q3 
08 
Q4 
09 
Q1 
09 
Q2 
09 
Q3 
09 
Q4 
10 
Q1 
10 
Q2 
10 
Q3 
10 
Q4 
Luxembourg 0.7 0.3 -1.0 -4.1 -1.2 -2.1 2.3 -0.7 1.2 1.5 0.0 1.2 
Slovakia -2.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 -8.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Finland 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -3.0 -6.0 -0.9 1.4 -0.4 0.7 3.0 0.1 1.5 
Belgium 0.8 0.4 -0.6 -2.0 -1.8 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.5 
Malta 2.8 1.2 0.3 -1.9 -2.8 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 -0.1 0.3 2.0 
Netherlands 0.5 -0.4 0.0 -1.2 -2.2 -1.2 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6 
Germany  1.1 -0.4 -0.4 -2.2 -4.0 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.9 0.8 0.5 
Austria 1.4 0.1 -1.1 -1.7 -1.8 -0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.5 1.1 
Portugal 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -1.1 -2.3 0.3 0.6 -0.1 0.9 0.3 0.2 -0.4 
Italy 0.4 -0.5 -1.1 -1.9 -3.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Czech 
Republic 
0.5 1.0 0.1 -1.6 -3.3 -1.1 0.4 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 
Poland 1.4 0.7 0.8 -0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 0.9 
Slovenia 1.5 1.0 0.4 -3.9 -5.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.2 1.2 0.5 0.3 
Bulgaria 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.4 -6.3 0.0 0.3 -3.1 0.9 1.6 0.7 0.5 
France 0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -1.4 -1.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Lithuania -0.9 1.5 -1.4 -0.9 -12.7 -1.3 0.3 -1.3 1.2 0.7 0.7 1.8 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0 -1.3 -2.0 -2.3 -1.6 -0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.7 -0.5 
Denmark -1.4 1.5 -1.8 -2.4 -2.3 -1.6 -0.2 0.3 0.0 1.5 1.1 -0.5 
Spain 0.5 0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -1.6 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 
Cyprus 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.0 -1.1 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.3 
Sweden -0.9 -0.1 0.0 -4.2 -2.4 0.5 -0.3 0.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.2 
Romania 3.0 1.1 -0.5 -1.5 -3.3 -1.9 -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 0.5 
Ireland -2.3 -2.1 0.0 -3.7 -2.7 -0.7 -0.6 -1.3 1.5 -0.5 0.4 -1.4 
Greece 0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0 -0.6 0.7 -1.9 -1.3 -1.6 -2.8 
Hungary 1.4 -0.2 -1.0 -2.1 -3.3 -1.2 -0.9 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 
Estonia -1.7 1.0 -1.1 -8.6 -4.7 -4.0 -1.3 1.1 -0.1 2.8 1.3 2.1 
Latvia -0.7 -0.1 -6.1 -1.8 -9.6 -1.2 -6.8 1.1 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.9 
Source: European Commission 2012d. 
Additionally, severe damage was also operationalized via a strongly rising unemployment 
rate (table 3) or a strongly rising inflation rate (table 4) or both respectively. The selection 
via the unemployment rate was conducted through sorting out countries in which the 
unemployment rate rose more than the mean of all countries combined from 2008 to 
2010. These countries are: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 3: Unemployment rate as percentage change in comparison to previous year 
Country/ 
Time 
2007 2008 
 
Change 
in % 
2009 
 
Change 
in % 
2010 
 
Change 
in % 
Change in %  
2008-2010 
Austria 4.4 3.8 -14% 4.8 21% 4.4 -9% -1% 
Belgium 7.5 7 -7% 7.9 11% 8.3 5% 3% 
Cyprus 3.9 3.7 -5% 5.3 30% 6.2 15% 13% 
Czech 
Republic 
5.3 4.4 -17% 6.7 34% 7.3 8% 9% 
D nmark 3.8 3.3 -13% 6 45% 7.4 19% 17% 
Estonia 4.7 5.5 17% 13.8 60% 16.9 18% 32% 
Finland 6.9 6.4 -7% 8.2 22% 8.4 2% 6% 
France 8.4 7.8 -7% 9.5 18% 9.8 3% 5% 
Germany 8.7 7.5 -14% 7.8 4% 7.1 -10% -7% 
Greece 8.3 7.7 -7% 9.5 19% 12.6 25% 12% 
Hungary 7.4 7.8 5% 10 22% 11.2 11% 13% 
Ireland 4.6 6.3 -37% 11.9 47% 13.7 13% 8% 
Italy 6.1 6.7 10% 7.8 14% 8.4 7% 10% 
Latvia 6 7.5 25% 17.1 56% 18.7 9% 30% 
Lithuania 4.3 5.8 35% 13.7 58% 17.8 23% 39% 
Luxembourg 4.2 4.9 17% 5.1 4% 4.6 -11% 3% 
Netherlands 3.6 3.1 -14% 3.7 16% 4.5 18% 7% 
Portugal 8.9 8.5 -4% 10.6 20% 12 12% 9% 
Romania 6.4 5.8 -9% 6.9 16% 7.3 5% 4% 
Slovenia 4.9 4.4 -10% 5.9 25% 7.3 19% 12% 
Spain 8.3 11.3 36% 18 37% 20.1 10% 28% 
United 
Kingdom 
5.3 5.6 6% 7.6 26% 7.8 3% 12% 
MEAN        12% 
Source: author’s calculation based European Commission 2012e. 
Note: The countries highlighted in white are countries with a mean unemployment rate from 
2008 to 2010 higher than the mean for all countries in this sample. 
 
The third indicator – inflation rate – is calculated against the previous year. Accordingly to 
the unemployment rate, the mean for 2008-2010 was calculated and those countries that 
were above the overall mean of inflation rate were chosen for further analysis. Because 
most of the countries have already shown significant unemployment rates and have 
already been put forward for further selection, only Romania was added based on the 
high increase of its inflation rate. 
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Table 4: Inflation rate as percentage of change to previous year 
Country/Time 2008 2009 2010 Mean  in % 2008-
2010 
Austria 3.2 0.4 1.7 1.77 
Belgium 4.5 0 2.3 2.27 
Cyprus 4.4 0.2 2.6 2.4 
Czech Republic 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.7 
Denmark 3.6 1.1 2.2 2.3 
Estonia 10.6 0.2 2.7 4.5 
Finland 3.9 1.6 1.7 2.4 
France 3.2 0.1 1.7 1.67 
Germany 2.8 0.2 1.2 1.4 
Greece 4.2 1.3 4.7 3.4 
Hungary 6 4 4.7 4.9 
Ireland 3.1 -1.7 -1.6 -0.07 
Italy 3.5 0.8 1.6 1.97 
Latvia 15.3 3.3 -1.2 5.8 
Lithuania 11.1 4.2 1.2 5.5 
Luxembourg 4.1 0 2.8 2.3 
Netherlands 2.2 1 0.9 1.37 
Portugal 2.7 -0.9 1.4 1.07 
Romania 7.9 5.6 6.1 6.53 
Slovenia 5.5 0.9 2.1 2.83 
Spain 4.1 -0.2 2 1.97 
United Kingdom 3.6 2.2 3.3 3.03 
MEAN    2.82 
Source: own calculation based on European Commission 2012f. 
Note: the countries highlighted in white are countries in which the mean inflation rate from 2008 
to 2010 is higher than the mean for all countries from 2008 to 2010. 
 
The selection via all three indicators yields the following 12 countries for further 
deliberation: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Ireland is still included despite the fact 
that it has neither shown extremely rising unemployment nor inflation rates because its 
overall GDP-drop during the crisis was one of the highest in Europe. As was stated in part 
5.2, the fluctuation of the GDP has the highest weight when analyzing economic damage. 
Thus, this exception seems appropriate. 
For the analysis of political protest against anti-crisis measures the account of CV II was 
necessary but not sufficient. In order to assume protest against anti-crisis measures such 
measures must have been implemented or at least announced between 2008 and 2010. 
To this end, the third control variable – austerity measures – was conceptualized and 
operationalized in part 5.2. What are the results of the control for this third variable for 
the 12 countries detected from the selection on CV I and CV II? Table 5 gives a simplified 
overview of the main anti-crisis austerity measures. These are cuts in public sector wages, 
increases in taxation and cuts in public benefit spending. In cases where singular austerity 
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measures were too minor to cause significant public outrage, they will not be counted and 
receive a ―No‖ in the table. To display details, an extensive overview of the measures 
taken in each country is provided in the appendix, table 21.  
Table 5: Anti-crisis measures by country 
Country/  
Anti-crisis 
measure 
Tax increases Wage cuts in public 
sector 
Cuts in public 
benefit spending 
Cyprus No No No 
Denmark No No No 
Estonia Yes Yes Yes 
Greece Yes Yes Yes 
Hungary Yes Yes Yes 
Ireland Yes Yes Yes 
Latvia Yes Yes Yes 
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes 
Romania No No No 
Slovenia No No No 
Spain Yes Yes Yes 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes No Yes 
Source: own interpretation based on data from table 21 in the appendix. 
Note: countries highlighted in white are countries that have implemented or announced significant 
austerity measures between 2008 and 2010. 
 
Table 5 indicates those countries from the initial universe of cases that remain for further 
differentiation on the independent variable. Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom all have applied at least two of the possible 
austerity measures to a higher degree than the other countries.  
Following the pre-selection on the control variables, the eight remaining countries have to 
be measured on the indicators of the independent variables. For a thorough analysis, at 
least four cases representing all possible combinations of the IV-variation will have to 
follow from the IV-selection. Those countries with the most significant values on both IVs 
will be chosen for the adjacent case study.  
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5.2 Variation of the Socioeconomic Status and the Political Opportunity 
Structure - Final Case Selection  
5.2.1 Selection according to the Socioeconomic Status (IV I) 
It was shown in part 5.1 that the selection based on the control variables has be followed 
by selecting on the independent variables. This represents the most significant step in the 
case-selection procedure. The representative cases for the final case study will have to 
have the highest or respective, lowest values on the independent variables in the four 
possible combinations. The first independent variable – socioeconomic status – was 
operationalized via three indicators: educational, occupational and income status. They 
will be measured applying the indicators total population having completed at least upper 
secondary education, gross national income per capita and distribution of employment 
status as % of the active population. Table 6 shows the distribution of people with at 
least secondary education across the countries left after the CV selection.  
Table 6: Distribution of people with at least secondary education in per cent 
Country Estonia Greece Ireland Latvia Lithuania Romania Spain UK Mean 
Mean 
2008-
2010  
88.87 61.6 71.67 87.03 91.3 74.8 51.7 74.7 75.2 
Source: European Commission 2011a.163 
 
Of the eight countries left Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia show the highest percentages of 
better educated people. Romania, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and especially 
Spain show the least percentage of people with at least secondary education for 2008 
until 2010 and thus a lower educational status. 
The indicator distribution of income was operationalized with the help of the HDI item 
income index (gross national income per capita) presented in table 7.  
                                           
 
163 An illustration for all study years and countries is enclosed in the appendix, table 22. 
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Table 7: Income index (gross national income per capita) 
Country Estonia Ireland Greece Spain Latvia Lithuania Romania UK Mean 
Mean 
2008-
2010 
0,73 0,82 0,79 0,8 0,71 0,73 0,66 0,83 0,75 
Source: UNDP 2012b.164  
Note: the index rages from 0 to 1 with higher scores showing a higher aggregate index. 
 
According to table 7, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Greece have higher indices 
pointing to a higher aggregate income, whereas Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and especially 
Romania show lower scores and therefore lower income levels.  
Finally, the occupational status in the eight countries left has to be assessed. The Eurostat 
variable occupational status contains the raw numbers of people employed as either (1) 
legislators, senior officials and managers, (2) professionals, (3) technicians and associate 
professionals, (4) clerks, (5) service workers and shop and market sales workers, (6) 
skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7) craft and related trades workers, (8) plant and 
machine operators and assemblers or (9) workers in elementary occupations165. These 
numbers were divided by the figures of the variable active population. The occupations 
(1) through (5) and (7) are regarded as higher status occupations. With the professions 
(1) through (4) this is due to the prestige of those professions. Concerning (5) service 
workers and shop and market sales workers as well as (7) craft and related trade 
workers, it is assumed accordingly to the causal mechanisms at work in the SES-model 
that workers in those professions act in highly interactive professions where they are able 
to acquire extended social skills that in turn are crucial for political participation. Table 8 
shows the dispersion of the aggregated numbers of the higher status professions (1) 
through (5) plus (7) for the years 2008 until 2010.  
Table 8: Percentage of distribution on different occupations as a mean for 2008-2010 
Country Estonia Ireland Greece Spain Latvia Lithuania Romania UK Mean 
Higher 
Occupation 
9.4 9.8 7.1 8.0 8.8 9.1 7.0 10.7 8.7 
Source: Eurostat 2012b.166 
 
                                           
 
164 Full table with data for each year 2008 through 2010 is provided in the appendix, table 23. 
165 Due to the insignificancy in numbers, those parts of population working in the armed forces and those 
stating ―no response‖ were not included in the assessment.  
166 Full table containing numbers for both high and low status professions for all years 2008 through 2010 are 
provided in the appendix, table 24. 
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The distribution along the high occupation status results in the following differentiation: 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia seem to have more workers in 
better positions whereas people in Romania, Spain and Greece are to a lesser extent 
employed in high-status jobs. 
The combination of all three SES-indicators that are considered additively reveals a 
picture summarized in table 9. 
Table 9: Distribution of countries along the SES-indicators and overall SES-status 
Value/Indicator Education 
status 
Income status Occupational 
status 
Overall SES-
status 
H
ig
h
 
Lithuania UK Ireland Ireland 
Estonia Ireland Lithuania Estonia 
Latvia Spain UK UK 
 Greece Latvia Latvia 
  Estonia Lithuania 
L
o
w
 
Romania Lithuania Romania Romania 
UK Estonia Spain Spain 
Ireland Latvia Greece Greece 
Greece Romania   
Spain    
Source: own depiction. 
 
Countries with a high status along at least two of the three SES-indicators have been 
attributed high overall SES-status. Respectively, countries with a low status along at least 
two of the three SES-indicators have been attributed low overall SES-status. This leads to 
the concession of a high SES-status to Ireland, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Latvia and 
Lithuania and a low SES-status to Spain, Greece and Romania. In order to further 
differentiate the endowments of the countries, the study will continue with the selection 
on IV II – the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure. 
5.2.2 Selection according to the Political Opportunity Structure (IV II) 
The independent variable political opportunity structure was conceptualized as the 
openness or closure of a state with the underlying assumption that the higher the degree 
of openness of a state, the lower the political protest activity in this state. This 
assumption follows a curvilinear connection between POS and political participation shown 
in figure 1 and with the curve cut at its climax because democracies only are considered 
in this study. It will be measured using the three indicators separation of powers, number 
of political parties and pluralism. 
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The separation of powers is firstly measured by the executive legislative relation 
according to Lijphart variable contained in the CPDS III. The data available encompass 
the years 2008 and 2009 and show the following distribution: Estonia, Greece, Latvia, 
Spain and the United Kingdom are parliamentary democracies. Ireland, Romania and 
Lithuania are semi-parliamentary democracies dominated by the parliament.167 Secondly, 
the judicial independence leading to a higher or lower separation of powers is accounted 
for using the judicial independence variable from the Economic Freedom of the World 
reports listed in table 10. The rating shows Ireland, the United Kingdom and Estonia to 
have higher and Spain, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania to have lower judicial 
independence. 
Table 10: Rating of judicial independence from 2008 to 2009 and mean rating 
Country/Time 2008 2009 Mean 2008-2009 
Estonia 7.5 7.4 7.45 
Greece 4.5 4.2 4.35 
Ireland 8.9 8.7 8.8 
Latvia 4.5 4.4 4.45 
Lithuania 4.6 4.3 4.45 
Romania 4.1 4.1 4.2 
Spain 5.1 4.7 4.9 
United Kingdom 8.4 8.8 8.6 
MEAN   5.9 
Source: own calculation based on: Gwarntey/Lawson/Hall 2011. 
Notes: the rating follows a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing the highest judicial independence and 
0 the least judicial independence. 
 
The second indicator is the number of political parties involved in the legislative process. 
It was operationalized with CPDS IIII data and refers to parties that dispose of seats in 
the country‘s legislative body. Table 11 shows the allocation of the combined effective 
numbers of parties for the years 2008 and 2009 in increasing order of the number. Spain, 
the United Kingdom, Greece and Ireland have the least numbers of parties with an 
influence on the legislative process, whereas Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have 
the most (>3). 
Table 11: Effective number of political parties involved in the legislative process 2008-
2009 
Country Spain UK Greece Ireland Romania Estonia Lithuania Latvia 
# of parties 2.34 2.46 2.61 3.0 3.72 4.37 5.79 6.0 
Source: own calculation based on Armingeon et al. 2011. 
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The last indicator is the pluralistic structure of a state. For one it was measured by 
looking at the possibilities for the initiation of referenda. For the other it was by looking at the 
degree of corporatism. The existence of popular referenda is depicted with three different items 
picked from CPDS III in table 12 – required referenda for changes in the constitution, popular 
veto triggered by the citizens and popular initiatives also triggered by the citizens.  
Table 12: Required referenda, popular veto and popular initiatives possibilities 2008-
2009 
Country Estonia Greece Ireland Latvia Lithuania Romania Spain UK 
Referendum 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Popular veto 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Popular initiative 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Source: own calculation based on Armingeon et al. 2011. 
Those countries that have at least two such possibilities for popular expression are 
considered as more pluralist than those with merely one or no such possibilities. 
Therefore, the more pluralist group consists of Latvia, Ireland, Lithuania and Spain and 
the less pluralist group of the United Kingdom, Greece, Estonia and Romania. 
Finally, corporatism has to be assessed. For its measurement the item routine 
involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic 
policy was traced in the ICTWSS data base. Table 13 summarizes the findings for the 
years 2008 through 2010. Spain and Ireland reveal high involvement of umbrella 
organizations in government decisions. In Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Greece 
they are partially given and in the United Kingdom they are non-existent. 
 
 Table 13: Routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on 
social and economic policy 2008-2010 
Country Estonia Spain Ireland Lithuania Latvia Romania UK Greece 
Rating of 
concertation 
1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 
Source: own calculation based on Visser 2011. 
Notes:  
2 = full concertation, regular and frequent involvement 
1 = partial concertation, irregular and infrequent involvement 
0 = non concertation, involvement is rare or absent.168 
 
                                           
 
168 Accordingly to table 12, no changes in the involvement have occurred between 2008 and 2010 in the given 
countries which makes a listing for every year and country redundant. 
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Summing up, in table 14 the allocation of all countries around all POS-indicators is 
dispersed and grouped in more open and less open169 systems. A more open system has a 
more independent legislative, a more independent judiciary, a high effective number of 
parties, grants the people various possibilities to initiate popular referenda and is not 
corporatist. 
Table 14: Distribution along the POS-indicators 
POS Executive-
legislative 
relation 
Judiciary 
independence 
Effective 
number of 
parties 
Referenda/ 
Initiatives 
Involvement 
of unions 
and 
employees 
Overall 
POS-
dispersion 
O
p
e
n
 
Estonia UK Romania Latvia UK Estonia 
Greece Ireland Estonia Ireland Greece Latvia 
Latvia Estonia Lithuania Lithuania Latvia Lithuania 
Spain  Latvia Spain Lithuania UK 
UK    Estonia  
    Romania  
L
e
s
s
 o
p
e
n
 Ireland Spain Spain Estonia Spain Ireland 
Lithuania Latvia UK Greece Ireland Spain 
Romania Lithuania Greece Romania  Greece 
 Greece Ireland UK  Romania 
 Romania     
Source: own depiction. 
 
The overall dispersion around the independent variable political opportunity structure was 
assessed identifying those countries with at least three open POS-features as rather open 
and those with less than three open opportunity structures as rather closed, at least as 
close as a democracy can get. According to the executed analysis the United Kingdom, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are open and Ireland, Spain, Greece and Romania less open 
systems. 
What are the combinations of SES-status and POS-levels in the countries that are still at 
consideration and which of the remaining countries can be picked as the most 
representative for the case study? Table 15 shows the composed SES- and POS-features. 
Table 15: Distribution of countries along SES-Status and POS-level 
Country Estonia Spain Ireland Lithuania Latvia Romania UK Greece 
SES-status High Low High High High Low High Low 
POS-level Open Closed Closed Open Open Closed Open Closed 
Source: own depiction. 
                                           
 
169 The differentiation does not point out open versus closed, because it cannot be spoken about closed 
democracies in Europe.  
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In the ideal case, four groups of countries would have been found according to their IV-
characteristics. The first group has a high SES and an open POS. This group encompasses 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the UK. The second group has a high SES and a closed 
POS. Here only Ireland is represented. In the third group low SES and closed POS have to 
be located. Out of the case universe Romania, Spain and Greece fit this categorization. 
The forth group has a low SES and an open POS. Unfortunately, none of the eight 
countries fit the last category. Therefore, Ireland, Romania and Estonia remain for deeper 
insight in the case study.  
Ireland is the only representative of the second category. Romania was picked over 
Greece and Spain because although its overall POS-level is similar to that of Greece and 
Spain, its overall SES-status is considerably lower than in Greece and Spain. Thus, 
Romania represents the most extreme of both cases. This is what is aimed for according 
to the case-selection method of this study (part 6). A similar reason leads to the selection 
of Estonia out of the four countries in the high SES and open POS group. Although 
Estonia‘s POS is not distinctively more open than that of the other three countries – the 
picture here is rather equivocal, considering the SES-level Estonia has a higher overall 
status and is therefore representative for this group.  
While it could not be ensured that every constellation of the SES-level and POS-status 
could be analyzed in detail in the consecutive case study, three strong cases were 
generated along their IV-characteristics. Estonia shows a high SES-level and an open 
political opportunity structure. This should lead to moderate political protesting according 
to the study‘s hypotheses. Ireland has both a high SES-level and a rather closed political 
opportunity structure. Therefore, it should display the highest degree of political 
protesting in reaction to anti-crisis measures. Lastly Romania, similarly to Estonia, should 
bear mixed results in political protesting due to its low SES-level and a rather closed 
political opportunity structure. Whether the hypotheses can be verified or have to be 
rejected will be exposed in more detail in the adjacent case study. The fact that one case 
is missing for the constellation of a low SES-level and an open POS-level leading to 
assumingly no political participation according to the study hypotheses is a deficit in this 
operationalization. Thus, the results of the case study will have to be critically assessed 
with respect to their explanatory power.  
                                   Julia Simon: Political Protest During Economic Crises 
 
62 
6. Case Studies 
As was revealed in the methodological section, the study employs a small-N case study 
for the hypotheses test. Having presented the cases with the highest variation on both 
IV‘s from the cases universe, the three remaining countries Estonia, Romania and Ireland 
shall be looked at more narrowly in this chapter. 
6.1 Socioeconomic Status in Estonia, Romania and Ireland  
The socioeconomic status of the universe of countries was partly presented in section 
6.2.1. In the case study the SES shall be examined in-depth. Educational status, income 
dispersion and the distribution of the working population across occupational fields were 
defined as the variables of the SES-status to be highlighted beneath. 
6.1.1 Estonia 
Estonia, along with the other two Baltic States Latvia and Lithuania, has shown very high 
educational status. It was operationalized incorporating the percentage of people with at 
least secondary education, meaning any equivalent to a high-school diploma. Estonia‘s 
mean from 2008-2010 amounted to almost 90%, which is a very high number in 
comparison with  for instance Spain with slightly over 50% of the population carrying 
such a degree. It has remained high within the time frame (see appendix, table 22). 
According to a World Bank development report, for Estonia different legacies might be 
assumed to still be in place, because it belongs to the group of states of the former Soviet 
Union. These are the emphasis on educational input instead of output, the imposition of 
educational policies from the top instead of from within the educational structures and a 
distorted allocation of resources for education. To prove the opposite, Estonia has by now 
outperformed many of its western counterparts.170 Moving ahead to the income status, in 
chapter 6.2.1 it was assessed using the indicator income index (gross national income per 
capita) presented in table 7. According to those numbers Estonia is located in the lower 
half of the countries‘ universe. However, along with Lithuania it has the highest income 
index within the countries of the lower group and they have been relatively steady 
throughout the study period (see appendix, table 23). 
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The next socio-economic status indicator is occupational or job status. Section 6.2.1 
revealed that Estonia is one of the countries with higher ratio of persons employed in 
higher-status occupation. During the years 2008-2010 about 8.0% of the working 
population were employed as legislators, senior officials and managers, 11.3% were 
professional, 10.3% technicians or of similar profession, 5% were clerks, 10% were 
working in the service and market industry, 11.6% were craft workers or working an 
sales. Together, this accounts for almost 60% of the population. On the other side of the 
raw, only 1% of the working population was employed in agriculture and fishery, 7.6% 
were plant and machine operators and about 11.3% were working in elementary 
occupation (table 16). 
Table 16: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Estonia as a mean for 
2008-2010 
Country/Time (1
) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (7) MEAN high (6) (8) (9) MEAN low 
Estonia 8.0 11.3 10.3 5.0 10.0 11.6 9.4 1.0 7.6 11.3 6.7 
Source: own calculation based on European Commission 2012b. 
Note: ―Mean high‖ is the mean percentage of people occupied in higher status professions, ―Mean 
low‖ is the percentage of people occupied in lower status professions. 
(1)=legislators, senior officials and managers, (2)=professionals, (3)= technicians and associate 
professionals, (4)=clerks, (5)=service workers and shop and market sales workers, (6)=skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers, (7)=craft and related trades workers, (8)=plant and machine 
operators and assemblers or (9)= workers in elementary occupations. 
 
Overall, a more thorough look at the aggregate socioeconomic status in Estonia confirms 
its allocation as a high-status country along the SES-line.  
6.1.2 Romania 
Romania is the second Eastern European country in the final case selection. Contrary to 
Estonia, Romania as one of the many former socialist republics which does not seem to 
have performed as well, at least in terms of its socioeconomic status indicators. The 
number of persons with at least secondary education in Romania accounts for about 75%, 
which is more than 10 percentage points lower than in Estonia.  
In accordance with the lower education level the income level in Romania turns out to be 
lower on average as well. The aggregated income level is the lowest in the cases 
universe. The gross national income per capita receives the lowest score of 0.66 on 
average between 2008 and 2010, with the score of 1 being the highest possible income 
level.  
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As for the scattering of the working population around the most important professions, 
the Romanian population was declared to be rather underrepresented in the professions 
of higher qualification. Table 17 shows the exact numbers aggregated for 2008-2010. 
Only 1% of Romanian working population was engaged as legislators, senior officials and 
managers, 9.3% stated to be professionals, 8.6% were technicians or other professional 
workers, 4.6% worked as clerks, 9.0% in service and sale and 9.6% in crafts and trade. 
On the other side of the occupational spectrum, however, it can be found that at least 
about 13% of the working population was engaged in elementary jobs. 
Table 17: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Romania as a mean for 
2008-2010 
Country/Time (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) MEAN 
high 
(6) (8) (9) MEAN 
low 
Romania 1.0 9.3 8.6 4.6 9.0 9.6 7.0 0.0 5.6 13.0 5.1 
Source: own calculation based on European Commission 2012b. 
Note: for table descriptions see table 16. 
 
All in all, the socioeconomic status in Romania along the lines of education, income and 
occupational status can be confirmed as rather low. 
6.1.3 Ireland 
Ireland was declared to have a high socioeconomic status in part 6. The percentage of 
people with at least secondary education totals about 72% as a mean for 2008-2010. 
Although it is even lower than in Romania, contrary to the latter it was markedly going up 
from 2008 to 2010, from around 70% to 73.5% (see appendix, table 22).  
Ireland is one of the leaders of countries in the sample universe when it comes to the 
dispersion around the income level (gross national income per capita). According to table 
7, the United Kingdom and Ireland dispose of the highest aggregate income levels. In 
Ireland the mean score for 2008-2010 is about 0.8. Thus, it is confirmed that the income 
level in Ireland is high, leading to a higher socioeconomic status and with it assumingly 
higher participation in political protesting.  
The last point of interest for Ireland is the occupational status of its citizens depicted in 
detail in table 18. 
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Table 18: Percentage of distribution on different occupations in Ireland as a mean for 
2008-2010 
Country/Time (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) MEAN 
high 
(6) (8) (9) MEAN 
low 
Ireland 8.0 14.3 5.0 11.0 15.3 5.0 9.8 0.3 6.6 6.6 4.0 
Source: own calculation based on European Commission 2012b. 
Note: for table description see table 16. 
 
8% of the Irish working population occupies legislative, senior official and manager 
positions, 14% are professionals, 5% are technicians or related roles, 11% work in public 
administration, about 15% are service and market sales workers and 5% are engaged in 
crafts and trade. All in all, Ireland deploys one of the highest numbers in the sample of 
persons in high status occupations.   
In sum, although the Irish educational level is not one of the highest in the sample 
chosen for this study, it has to be acknowledged that it is constantly growing and was 
higher than the EU27 average in 2010 for the first time. Furthermore, Ireland was the 
country with the highest income level compared to Estonia and Ireland and has shown 
more people in higher status occupations than both other countries. Hence, Ireland 
deserves the concession of a high socioeconomic status.  
6.2 Political Opportunity Structure in Estonia, Ireland and Romania 
To recapture, the degree of political opportunity structure was conceptualized in this 
study as the formal political institutional structure of a state pointing to either the 
openness or closure of the formal access to politics. The underlying hypothesis was that 
the higher the degree of openness of a state, the lower the participation in political 
protest. The indicators to measure the openness of a state have been broken down to the 
balance of powers in a state, the number of its political parties having an influence on 
policies and the pluralism within the state. The characteristics of the indicators have 
already been highlighted in chapter 6.2.2. On the following pages, they will be expanded 
with respect to the case examples.  
6.2.1 Estonia 
The overall Estonian POS was exposed to be rather open in section 6.2.2. Estonia is a 
parliamentary democracy by constitution. The unicameral parliament (Riigikogu) is the 
highest institutional authority in Estonia. It elects the president endowed with 
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representative tasks with a two-thirds majority and initiates and approves legislation that 
is supported by the prime minister, who in turn is directly responsible to the Riigikogu.171 
The judiciary is independent in Estonia. According to the data for judicial independence 
from the Economic Freedom of the World Report, it has an average of 7.45 of 10 possible 
―freedom points‖ on the scale of judicial independence and is only behind the UK and 
Ireland of those countries considered in the primary cases universe. The missing points to 
achieve full judiciary independence in Estonia might stem from the financial dependency 
of the district and circuit courts from the executive. Whereas the Supreme Court in 
Estonia is an independent institution, the lower courts do not dispose of own 
administrative staff.172 Although reforms of the judiciary were elaborated between 2009 
and 2010, none have been implemented so far.173 
Focusing on the composition of the legislature, or the effective number of parties as it 
was operationalized in section 4.2, Estonia amounts to the number 4.37 of effective 
parties. It is the highest number compared to the other countries in the case study, but it 
is the lowest number compared to the two other Baltic States. After the independence in 
1991 many parties were founded, but only six major ones have consolidated by now. As 
the relatively high number of effective parties already suggests, most (mainly center-
right) coalitions and governments have not lasted more than one year in Estonia after 
independence.174 Interestingly however, the coalition put in place with the parliamentary 
elections in March 2007 of the center-liberal Estonian Reform Party (Eesti 
Reformierakond), a faction of the center-right Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Samaa ja 
Res Publica Liit) and the Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond) lasted 
until May 2009. Then, both conservative parties renounced the social democrats and 
continued to govern as a minority coalition until new elections in 2011. In 2011, the 
coalition led by the Estonian Prime minister Andrus Ansip was re-elected.175 The other 
parties in the Riigikogu are the center-left Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond) as 
the major opposition party, the centre-left People‘s Union (Eestimaa Rahvaliit) and the 
Green Party (Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised).176 Thus, six different parties were in the 
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Estonian parliament throughout the time of the crisis, although only about four could have 
had actual influence on the legislation due to the allocation of MP-seats.  
Turning to the pluralist-corporatist divide, it was found in the case selection that only a 
required referendum exists when amendments to the Constitution or other national issues 
are submitted to the people. However, they can only be forwarded to the citizens by the 
parliament. The citizens themselves do not possess the right to call for referenda or 
popular initiatives. This signifies a rather closed system. Over and above, it was found in 
the case selection that Estonia allows for partial concertation with an irregular and 
infrequent involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and 
economic policies. This empirical finding is supported by qualitative research on Estonian 
corporatism. Despite the efforts of the Estonian social democratic party, the social 
dialogue in Estonia between the government and the main employees‘ peak organizations 
like trade unions remains very limited. Only one central employees‘ association is allowed 
to represent workers in tripartite negotiations. Moreover, such negotiations take place on 
a very infrequent basis.177 Trade unions are predominantly active on the factory- and not 
the state-level. Additionally, trade unions and other employees‘ organizations are 
fragmented and have low membership numbers compared to the EU-average.178 During 
the crisis years, there have been attempts on the part of trade unions and similar 
organizations to engage in tripartite dialogue between the state, employers and 
employees. However, prior to the implementations of most anti-crisis measures social 
partners, trade unions or employers organizations have either not been consulted at all, 
or tripartite meetings have shown only negligible results.179 
On the whole, Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a relatively independent 
judiciary, a relatively high effective party number and a relatively high level of pluralism. 
It points to a high degree of openness of the political opportunity structure. According to 
the second study hypothesis, this should detect a rather low degree of political protesting. 
However, combining the second hypothesis with the first hypothesis on the high degree of 
SES in Estonia, the results should be more diverse. The combination of the SES-status 
and the POS-level should bring about some political protesting against anti-crisis 
measures.  
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6.2.2 Romania 
Romania is a semi-presidential democracy dominated by the parliament. Although the 
rights of the president are more abundant than in Estonia, he is hindered by the directive 
on countersignature required from the prime minister. The latter is also constrained by 
various limitations on his rights and is obliged to obey the Romanian bicameral 
parliament.180 Therefore, the separation of powers between the executive and legislature 
is limited in Romania and stands as one attribute of this system‘s closure. Moreover, the 
personal constellation in Romania in the time period at consideration has been rather 
harmful to a functioning political process. This was due to emerging personal rivalries and 
ongoing power-struggle between president and prime minister, leading to the kind of 
negative political deadlock in the country, often credited to semi-presidential systems.181 
The rating of the independence of the Romanian judiciary added up to only slightly more 
than 4 of 10 possible points according to the Economic Freedom of the World Report (see 
section 6.2.2). Deficits in the judiciary are significant: the constitutional court is assumed 
to give way to political pressure too often and is rarely dismissing political law on the 
basis of the constitution.182 Moreover, the constitutional court is used for political decision-
making to an increasingly high degree, one example being the impeachment procedure 
against Romania‘s current president Traian Basescu which was championed by the prime 
minister and his supporters in 2007.183 
The effective number of political parties was established at 3.72 for the years 2008 
through 2010. Since independence, Romania was characterized as a ―too-many-parties‖ 
system for quite a long time. The still ongoing consolidation of Romanian parties led to a 
many-party system in the 2000s with two large party blocks and several minor parties. 
Main forces are the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat), the National-
Liberal Party (National Liberal Partidul) and the Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul 
Democrat-Liberal).184 After the 2008 parliamentary elections the Democrat-Liberal Party 
formed a ―grand coalition‖ with the Social Democrat Party, which broke down in 2009 
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followed by a minority coalition of the democrat-liberal party and the minor Democratic 
Union of Hungarians of Romania.185 
Similarly to Estonia, referenda are only required in Romania when the constitution is 
subject to changes or important bills or decisions are given over to popular decision from 
the government or the parliament. The initiation of referenda is not possible from within 
the population, displaying the closure of the system.  
Along the corporatism scale Romania, resembling Estonia, provides for partial 
concertation meaning irregular and infrequent involvement. On the part of several trade 
unions it is marked by a high proximity to political parties, which hinders their internal 
cohesion. On the part of employers a peak organization only recently has been put into 
place and has not yet gained the required strength. All in all, the social dialogue in 
Romania does take place on the sectorial, regional and even national level via trilateral 
bargaining to a limited degree. However, in those meetings, the government remains in 
the strongest position.186 
On the whole, Romania can be described as a rather closed political system based on the 
case analysis because its executive-legislative relation is still not clearly defined and poses 
obstacles to political processes. The independence of the Romanian judiciary is still highly 
contested. Although the number of political parties is high in Romania, their actual 
influence on the decision-making process is low because of high intra-party cleavages. 
Romania does not offer its citizens the right to set in motion public initiatives and 
referenda. However, Romania is to some degree pluralistically organized in the way that 
its corporatist system is only developed to a very minor degree. 
The low socioeconomic status in Romania and its rather closed political system should 
produce interesting results when considering the level of political protesting against anti-
crisis measures. On the one hand, a low socioeconomic status leads to the assumption of 
low participation. On the other hand however, the rather closed political opportunity 
structure should lead to more political protesting according to the second study 
hypothesis. In combination, a moderate degree of protesting is to be expected. 
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6.2.3 Ireland 
Ireland is a semi-presidential system dominated by the parliament. The president is 
elected directly for a term of seven years and appoints the prime minister (Taoiseach). 
The Taoiseach is the leader of the coalition of the Irish parliament – the House of 
Representatives (Dáil Éireann). The Taoiseach and his cabinet are directly responsible to 
the parliament. Because the president has largely representative functions, the term of a 
semi-presidential system is rather symbolic.187 When it comes to the separation of 
powers, the executive in Ireland is assumed to be quite dominant over the legislature, 
hereby limiting the openness of the system.188 
The ranking of the Irish judiciary received 8.8 of 10 possible points according to the 
Economic Freedom of the World reports. It is the country in the sample universe with the 
best ranking due to a complete independence of the judiciary in the exercise of its 
powers. Judges can only be removed from office by a common decision of the House of 
Representatives as well as the second Irish chamber – the Senate (Seanad Éireann).189 
The Irish party system has long been considered as a two-and-a-half party system. The 
major parties are Fianna Fail, a center-right catch-all party, and Fine Gael, the Irish 
conservative party. The third party often allying with one of the major powers in place is 
the social democratic Irish Labor Party. Other parties that have garnered some attention 
during the last few decades are the liberal Progressive Democrats, the Greens, the 
Worker‘s Party and Democratic Left.190 Despite the evolution of smaller parties, the 
effective number of parties in the Irish legislature is fixed at 3.0 according to CPDS III for 
the time period of this study. The government during this period was a coalition of Fianna 
Fail, the Greens and Progressive Democrats, and was voted out of office in the recent 
elections in 2011 when it was replaced by a coalition of Fine Gael and the Labor Party.191 
Along the lines of direct popular participation, Ireland has been classified as rather 
pluralistic. It allows for both the required referenda on constitutional and other legal 
matters initiated top-down as well as for popular veto powers initiated bottom-up. 
Finally, the corporatist system of Ireland shall be illuminated. In the recent decades, 
Ireland has somehow become the prototype for state concertation based on social pacts. 
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This has already become visible by its high ranking along the routine involvement of 
unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy 2008-2010 
in chapter 6.2.2. The variation of corporatism is based upon social pacts and was initiated 
in Ireland at the end of the 1980s giving birth to over 100 social pacts until today. These 
usually are set in motion between the government, peak employers‘ and employees‘ 
organizations, and stand out as the prevalent modes of welfare, labor market, and wage 
reform.192 All political parties in Ireland support such a mode of government to some 
degree.193 The social pacts take the form of social partnership programs and have initially 
been set in place to regulate wages but have extended to other policies like taxes, 
unemployment, welfare and the like.194 Amongst others, due to this trend, the unions and 
other workers‘ as well as employees‘ organizations have been reduced or merged into 
larger and more influential unions. The government‘s conduct concerning social pacts 
during the recent crisis thus is a highly interesting and a comprehensively analyzed 
issue.195 The social pact system of Ireland has not remained unaffected or profited from 
the crisis but was significantly damaged. Although the government invested a lot of 
energy into negotiations with its social partners, they have for the most part ended with 
disagreement and unilateral imposition of anti-crisis measures that were presented in 
section 6.1. The suspension of a partnership agreement in 2009 is the most visible sign of 
the vulnerability of social pacts in Ireland at a time of increased economic pressure.196 
Although the three different actors have reached another agreement in 2010, the co-
called ―Croke Park agreement‖ or ―Public Service Agreement 2010-2014‖, the economic 
crisis has proven to be a hard test on Ireland‘s social partnership system.197 
All in all, Ireland‘s system has to be classified as rather closed, despite its largely 
independent judiciary. The executive-legislative balance tends to prioritize the executive, 
the party number in Ireland is rather low, it offers limited possibilities for its citizens to 
directly participate in politics and more than anything else, it is still a highly corporatist 
system despite cracks in the social pacts during the recent economic crisis. Together with 
Ireland‘s high socioeconomic status, such preconditions should cause the highest rates of 
political protest action in this country. 
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The socioeconomic status and the political opportunity structure in the case study 
countries have been examined to a full extent in this chapter. The study hypotheses 
posed were that higher socioeconomic status and a rather closed political opportunity 
structure lead to a higher degree of political protest. According the combined study 
hypotheses, the examination leads to the preliminary assumption of the highest grade of 
protest against anti-crisis measures in Ireland. Estonia and Romania both should show 
some level of protest action, but it is supposed to be much more limited than in Ireland. 
Again, it has to be mentioned that no case was found in the course of the case selection 
with a low SES-status but an open political opportunity structure that should make 
political protest improbable. Nevertheless, the three remaining cases should bear enough 
explanatory power to put some light on protest behavior against anti-crisis measures. The 
final examination of such behavior will be executed in the next chapter. 
6.3 Political Protest in Estonia, Romania and Ireland in Response to 
Anti-crisis Measures 2008-2010 
The financial situation in the three countries between 2008 and 2010 was already 
presented in section 6.1. Estonia and Ireland entered the economic and financial crisis 
very early. Along with the United States, Latvia and Iceland they have been affected 
since the first quarter of 2008.198 Ireland, the so called ―Celtic Tiger‖, as well as 
Estonia, one of the ―Baltic Tigers‖, so-named after the East Asian Tigers and 
characterized by very rapid economic expansion with vastly growing GDP-rates, both 
have undergone strong economic growth in the pre-crisis period. Accordingly, in both 
countries the eruption of the crisis was due to their high dependence on the 
international market, the high indebtedness of both countries‘ citizens, caused by 
expanding consumerism, and a real estate bubble that had burst with the first signs of 
financial drawbacks. Both countries have also implemented various austerity packages 
and budget cuts during the two years in observation. Ireland, amongst several other 
countries had to adhere to the EU and IMF requirements to receive major financial loans 
(or ―bailouts‖, mostly paid in several tranches). Estonia rigorously implemented most of 
its measures that were aimed at an internal devaluation and many of its short-term 
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emergency programs in order to meet the EU-criteria for joining the Euro-zone.199 
Estonia succeeded with this strict fiscal policy and was approved for the adaption of the 
common European currency (the Euro) in 2011.200 Although in this study the time 
period is limited to the initial world-wide financial crisis from 2008 to 2010, it is 
important to stress at this point that Ireland is one of the countries that, although 
seemingly stabilized by the middle of 2010, fell in the arms of the next financial ―Euro-
crisis‖ that began to loom in 2010 and endures until the time of writing of this paper. 
The Irish GDP rate fell in the last quarter of 2010 and then again starting in third 
quarter of 2011, meaning that further IMF tranches were transferred leading to budget 
cuts as well as further protests on the streets of Ireland. The latter, however, are 
neglected in this study for reasons stated in section 5.3. 
Romania shows a slightly different picture than both ―tiger‖ economies. It entered the 
crisis later, in the fourth quarter of 2008.201 Romania struggled from long-lasting credit 
expansion, the so-called credit bubble. Moreover, it had difficulties controlling its inflation 
rate, and stepped into the crisis with major debt rates. Romania has received an IMF 
standby agreement in 2009, which is marked as the start of major anti-crisis measures in 
late 2008 and especially from early 2009 onwards.202 Romania was still very shaky during 
2010 but economic growth started to reappear in the second half of that year.203 
Looking at the expansion of the crisis in these three countries and the implementation of 
harsh anti-crisis austerity measures starting in the middle of 2008 at the latest, anti-
protest behavior in all three countries throughout the whole time period seems to be 
possible. To get hold of the degree of protest action in Estonia, Romania and Ireland, 
protest will be measured applying a newspaper content analysis. This method of 
measurement of protest action was abundantly described in part 2. To reiterate, firstly the 
source will be searched for demonstrative and confrontational activities, specifically 
protests, demonstrations, riots and sit-ins only. Secondly, actual mobilization will be 
accounted for; the announcement of protesting as protest potential will be neglected. 
Thirdly, it was decided to use the news articles issued by the news agency Agence France 
Presse that are available via the LexisNexis Academic research platform due its 
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availability, actuality and reliability. Finally, within the results displayed and most suitable 
for quantification, the hard indicators of protest behavior will be looked for: timing of the 
political protest, time span of the political protest, number of participants and the form of 
political protest. 
The four preconditions lead to the following search path within AFP: [(((crisis!) AND 
HLEAD(country!) AND (protest! OR riot! OR demonstr! OR sit-in! OR strike!)) and 
Date(geq(01/01/2008) and leq(12/31/2010)))]. The Boolean options AND allow to search 
for different items within the same article. Thus, the term ―crisis‖, the name of the 
respective country and a least one of the items pointing to protest – ―protest‖, 
―demonstration‖, ―riot‖ or ―sit-in‖ have to be given in the article, whereby the name of the 
country has to appear in the article title or a least in the heading (HLEAD). The Boolean 
option OR allows for the proliferation of at least one of the terms for political protest. 
Finally, the Boolean option exclamation mark (!) at the end of each word allows for the 
provision of any deviations from the word stem.204 Every article yielded by the Boolean 
search will be analyzed for the four hard indicators of protest behavior. Those that prove 
to contain any information on anti-crisis protest will be subsequently used to assess the 
degree of the same. 
In table 19 the results of the content analysis are summarized. The simple preliminary 
count of results following the command presented above typed into LexisNexis Academic 
to some amount reveals the expected degree of protesting in the case study countries. 
For Romania the search yields 71 matching articles, for Estonia there are only 22 articles 
matching the search criteria, whereas for Ireland the highest match is found: 228 articles 
issued by Agence France Presse. This, however, does not disclose any information about 
the occurrence or strength of political protest.   
Table 19: Political protest in Estonia, Romania and Ireland against anti-crisis 
measures between 2008 and 2010 
 Timing Duration # of 
participants 
Action form 
Estonia - - - - 
Romania After freezes of salaries in 
the public sector and 
reduction of expenses in 
2009 
One day 
05/14/2009 
Several thousand March with slogans in front of 
government buildings and the 
economy ministry in Bucharest, 
workers from the energy and car 
manufacturing sectors, harbor and 
post office employees  
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After the order to public 
sector employees of 10 
days of unpaid leave and 
rumors about further cuts 
following a deal for a 
second IMF installment 
One day 
08/11/2009 
Several hundred  Street demonstrations of police officers 
in Bucharest 
After announcement of 
public-sector salary system 
and pensions reform due 
to IMF commitments 
One day 
10/7/2009 
Between 
150.000 (police 
statistics) and 
300.000 (trade 
unions) 
Street demonstration in Bucharest  
After announcement of 
wage and pension cuts 
(25% and 15%) due to 
deal with the IMF 
One day 
05/17/2010 
Between 300.000 
(police records) 
and 500.000 
(trade unions) 
Street demonstrations of teachers, civil 
servants, medical staff, police and 
pensioners 
After announcement of 
public sector salaries cuts 
by 25%, a 24% increase 
on consumption tax, raise 
of retirement age to 65 by 
2030 and freeze of 
pensions in 2011 
One day 
09/22/2010 
About 9.000 
(police records) 
Street march from the Senate to 
government headquarters in Bucharest 
After announcement of 
salary and job cuts 
One day 
09/24/2010 
About 5.000 Street protest by Romanian policemen  
In response to 
announcement of 25% 
salary cuts 
One day 
10/05/2010 
About 6.500 Street protests in front of the prime 
minister‘s office and in front of the 
presidential palace, Romanian teachers 
In opposition to austerity 
plans announced since 
07/2010 
One day 
10/27/2010 
 
Between 20.000 
(police) and 
80.000 people 
(trade unions) 
Protests: a march and a rally in front of 
the parliament and in front of the 
prime minister's office in Bucharest; 
nurses, professors, police officers, 
statisticians, electricity plant workers 
and other civil servants from all over 
the country Ireland In opposition austerity 
package, especially against 
increased pensions levy for 
about 350,000 public 
servants 
One day 
02/21/2009 
(largest protest 
for 30 years) 
Up to 120.000 
people (police 
records) 
Demonstration organized by the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), 
teachers, police, and other civil 
servants 
Against the government‘s 
plans for budget cuts 
One day 
09/30/2009 
15.000 people  Trade union rally and demonstrations 
in front of the parliament in Dublin 
Against austerity cuts in 
the next budget and after 
failed social dialogue 
One day 
24/10/2009 
250.000 people  Public sector workers demonstrations 
Sit-in against lay-offs due 
austerity measures 
Two months 
from 02/2009 
 Sit-in by the workers of the Waterford 
crystal factory 
Against austerity measures 
to meet the requirements 
for IMF bailout 
One day 
11/23/2010 
About 100 
protesters 
Protesters break in into parliament 
until police pushed them away 
Against newly planned 
austerity measures: cut of 
up to 25.000 jobs, cuts in 
public sector pay, pensions 
and social welfare (to meet 
IMF requirements) 
 
One day 
11/27/2010 
Between 150.000 
people (according 
(ICTU) and 50.000 
(police figure) 
March through Dublin ―March for a 
better, fairer Way‖, largely peaceful, 
although some bottles are thrown and 
fires set by single persons, one 
arrested 
Source: own depiction on the basis of AFP news reports 2008-2010, full list of articles 
used is included in the appendix, table 25. 
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Evaluating all of the displayed articles, it was found that in the Irish case many of the 
news referred to conflicts (often described as crises) in Northern Ireland. In Romania, 
many matches dealt with conflicts (crises) with the Roma population.  
In the end, for Estonia about eight articles genuinely referred to the financial crisis and 
protesting in Estonia. Astonishingly however, as shown in table 19, zero protests 
whatsoever in direct reaction to harsh anti-crisis measures was reported for Estonia. All 
eight articles have been describing the crisis in Estonia but when reporting protest 
behavior they exclusively mentioned protests in neighboring Latvia and Lithuania, 
countries that have implemented similar anti-crisis policies and where some protest seem 
to have occurred. Therefore, the finding for Estonia, where at least some protest behavior 
was expected coming from the combination of HI and HII is that the Estonian population 
has remained completely resilient and did not complain out loud in response to its 
government‘s conduct. Estonians have even reelected their crisis prime minister as was 
already mentioned above.205 
For Romania moderate protest was expected from the symbiosis of the two study 
hypotheses. The newspaper analysis produced about ten AFP articles with valuable 
content. Thus, between 2008 and 2010 about ten major newsworthy protest actions have 
taken place in Romania. As table 19 reveals they were to a large part peaceful 
demonstrations and marches against austerity measures and have ranged from several 
hundred to an estimated highest number of 500.000 protesters. Taking into account 
numbers reported by trade unions within the AFP articles, two of the protest actions have 
broken the margin of 100.000 participants. One protest action was just slightly below that 
margin with about 80.000 protesters, and four further actions have remained under the 
10.000 participants mark. For the sake of comparability, putting the numbers of 
protesters in relation to the overall Romanian population which totals to about 19.000.000 
citizens, between 0.02% and 2.6% of the total population participated in the anti-crisis 
demonstrations. 
In Ireland, despite many overall hits in the LexisNexis inquiry, also only about ten articles 
actually referred to the unit of this study‘s analysis. Within these ten articles, six protest 
activities that actually took place were reported. Two of the protests were minor – one 
refers to a small demonstration of about 100 people. The second refers to a sit-in in a 
factory in Waterford with no accurate reports concerning numbers of protesters reported 
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but with a high media echo. Within the four remaining protest actions, three crossed the 
100.000 participants‘ margin with the highest number of 250.000 people attending. The 
last protest crossed the 10.000 marge with about 15.000 people demonstrating. In 
relation to the country‘s population of about 4.500.000 people, the percentages range 
from 0.3% to about 5.5%. Over and above, more radical forms of political protest became 
visible in Ireland in comparison to Romania. The sit-in in Waterford is one example, the 
second being the ―March for a better, fairer way‖ in November 2010, where some violent 
action occurred. 
In sum, no political protest against anti-crisis action was found in Estonia. In Romania 
about ten protest actions were conducted between 2008 and 2010. In comparison to 
Ireland, however, although there seem to have been slightly more protests in Romania, 
they had relatively lower numbers of attendants. More than that, they were largely 
peaceful demonstrations, whereas in Ireland, different types of political protests were 
detected. Thus, Estonia reveals the lowest (or no) degree of political protesting, the 
degree of political protesting in Romania can be described as relatively high and enduring 
but not highly confrontational. The degree of protesting in Ireland was less enduring than 
in Romania, but with higher numbers of participants and much more confrontational 
action forms. Therefore, it was the highest of the three countries.  
How do the results of the analysis of the dependent variable relate to those on the 
independent variables socioeconomic status and political opportunity structure described 
above? Can the hypotheses formulated be confirmed looking at political protest behavior 
of Estonia, Romania and Ireland? The answers to these questions shall be provided in the 
concluding section of part 7. 
6.4 To Protest or not to Protest? Verification and Assessment of the 
Study Hypotheses  
The case study was conducted on the basis of the preceding theoretical and 
methodological reasoning. The theoretical execution led to the formulation of two study 
hypotheses. HI: the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of 
individuals in a country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis 
measures in this country. HII: the higher the degree of openness of the political 
opportunity structure of a state, the lower the degree of political protest against anti-crisis 
measures in this state. The case study looked at the IVs SES-status and POS-openness as 
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well as at the DV degree of political protesting against anti-crisis measures between 2008 
and 2010 in Estonia, Romania and Ireland.  
Estonia has shown a high overall SES-level and a relatively open POS. However, no 
political protesting against governmental austerity programs and implementations 
whatsoever could be traced in this country in the newspaper content analysis. According 
to the first study hypothesis, Estonia should have shown a high degree of protesting, 
according to the second study hypotheses a low degree of protesting. In combination, a 
moderate degree was expected. One reason for the political protest apathy in Estonia 
might have been the exodus of people with assumingly high SES-status.206 Immigration 
was steadily increasing in this country until 2006 and went down for the first time in 2007 
showing that the citizens of Estonia began to build more trust in the situation in their 
motherland. Starting in 2008 however, the population felt the urge to migrate again in 
steadily rising numbers. Accordingly, in 2008 re-immigration to Estonia fell in numbers 
again.207 This point could back the first study hypothesis, by showing that those able and 
willing to protest simply have made themselves heard by the so-called ―voting by feet‖. 
This point nonetheless only shows one possible reason for the withdrawn reaction of 
Estonians to anti-crisis measures and cannot be accounted as a full-blown explanation for 
the populations‘ behavior, especially considering neighboring Latvia and Lithuania that 
show similar immigration numbers.  
Ireland displays a relatively high SES-level and a rather closed POS. By expectation, it 
should have been the host of most political protest in comparison to both other cases. 
This expectation was confirmed looking at the protest behavior analysis. Ireland showed 
slightly less numbers of political action than Romania, in their scope however, they were 
more abundant, meaning that a higher percentage of the population participated in the 
protest and the forms of protest action were at times more radical and provocative than 
in Romania. Thus, the case of Ireland confirms the study hypotheses in their symbiosis.  
Romania revealed a relatively low SES-level, but proved to have a rather closed political 
opportunity structure. Despite the expected moderate degree of protesting, although 
protest was less populated and less radical than in Ireland, by and large it was higher 
than expected according to the pooled study hypotheses.  
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The empirical results have to be embraced with a high amount of caution due to the fact 
that no case was found in the case selection with a low SES-status and an open political 
opportunity structure. This case would have needed to show no value on the dependent 
variable whatsoever. Whether such a case would disprove HI and HII remains the subject 
of further examination with different examples.  
Other explanations that might have been missing in this study will be further pointed out 
in the closing discussion which will provide a summary of the study and implications for 
further research on political protest behavior in times of financial and economic crises. 
Summary and Conclusion  
Political participation in general and political protesting as one mode of political 
participation in particular is crucial to the existence of any genuine democracy. This was 
the starting point for the research on the question of what happens to political 
participation in democracies in times of financial and political crises. Are citizens part of 
the decision-making procedure when the economic future of a country is at stake and in 
what way are citizens being involved or bring themselves in? It was expected at the onset 
of the study that citizens personally highly affected by economic crises and especially the 
measures that governments take to fight such crises, would participate politically to avoid 
or reverse such implications and would especially tend towards political protest. The fact 
that citizens in different countries incline to such reactions to different degrees provided 
the ground for the puzzling question of the study: Why do some countries have a higher 
degree of protest against anti-crisis measures than other countries?  
To approach this question using a positivist research design that relies on the testing of 
hypotheses drawn from theoretical accounts on the subject of matter, the most important 
theories and approaches dealing with political protest were displayed. From the vast 
theoretical collection on this subject two approaches were chosen for further development 
in the research design. The first approach – the socioeconomic status model – yielded the 
first study hypothesis:  the higher the degree of the aggregated socioeconomic status of 
individuals in a country, the higher the degree of political protest against anti-crisis 
measures in this country. 
The second theoretical account – the political opportunity structure model – bore the 
second study hypothesis, claiming the openness of the POS to an most important feature 
for political protesting in times of crisis: the higher the degree of openness of the political 
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opportunity structure of a country, the lower the degree of political protest against anti-
crisis measures in this country. Both hypotheses were tested in combination applying a 
small-N case study. Prior to examination, the cases were selectively chosen from a large 
cases universe, firstly via control variables and secondly based on the highest variation of 
the cases on the study‘s independent variables. In the subsequent case study the 
independent variables as well as the dependent variable were carefully measured and set 
in relation to one another. The case study that unfortunately could only analyze three 
different cases due to a missing case with the special constellation of a low SES-status 
and an open POS, resulted in a partial verification of the combined study hypotheses. Due 
to the lack of a fourth case, the results have to be accepted with restraint and need 
further verification with future examples from other regions and time periods.   
As was revealed in the introductory chapters, the research of protest behavior in times of 
economic crisis stands at its very beginning at the time of writing. This study applied the 
micro-level socioeconomic status model and the macro-level political opportunity structure 
model. In further analyses, it would be of value to prove, if those people that are 
socioeconomically better off and would thus participate more politically according to HI, 
actually were the ones within the society affected most by the crisis. In the case that only 
lower stratums of society were affected to a high degree, HI might have been verified. 
Unfortunately, this differentiation was not feasible within the scope of this study. 
There are further theoretical accounts that also might have been a stake in explaining 
why people protest against anti-crisis measures in some countries and restrain from it in 
others. Examples are cultural explanations that use the political culture in states as an 
argument for different reactions and different degrees of political participation and thus 
the degree of democratic consolidation in those countries. This might have to some extent 
be of importance in Estonia, where peopled tended to exit the country rather than to fight 
against anti-crisis measures and to make their voices heard on the political arena. 
According to this argument, people in Estonia in particular and in the Baltic States in 
general tend to political apathy.208 The newspapers analysis however showed that even if 
in Estonia there was no political protesting whatsoever, even the few articles that put up 
a connection between the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 and political protests 
pointed to protests to both the assumingly similarly apathetic Baltic States of Latvia and 
Lithuania. Thus, such cultural explanations bear little explanatory value in this context. 
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Moreover, it could be just as adequate to say that Estonians were restricted in their 
political outrage because they were strongly aware and committed to their impending 
entry into the Eurozone and were thus sticking to what their government carried out on 
their shoulders. 
The political culture explanation bears connections to path-dependency accounts that 
highlight experiences in the past to mark their track in the present. Here, the main 
argument is that in countries that have recently undergone crises which are still 
memorable to their citizens, less political protesting is visible. It implies that the citizens 
being used to economic crises bear a higher awareness of the importance of the 
consequences that their governments have to draw.209 However, such explanations seem 
rather superficial considering the fact that both Estonia and Romania went through major 
economic crises in the course of the 1990s but showed different degrees of protesting 
during the recent recession.  
Other explanations allow for the inclusion of influence from outside and examine it on 
political protest. This embraces the influence of the IMF that sponsors austerity programs 
throughout the European Union. The assumption here is that ―the likelihood of political 
protest and mass disruption, as well as the intensity of such responses, was enhanced by 
increased external pressures by the IMF for countries to adopt the austerity 
programs‖.210 This actually might hold true even on the cases considered in this study‘s 
analysis – Estonia did not refer to the IMF as against to Ireland and Romania. In the latter 
countries a higher degree of political protesting became visible than in the former. This 
explanation should be subject to further examination along with the study‘s SES- and 
POS- approaches.  
What is more, the time frame in further studies will have to be widened, which could not 
be accomplished in a study of this scope and at this time. Further accounts of political 
protesting in times of crises would have to rely on longer time-periods and higher-N case 
studies. The fact that the combined approach could only partially be verified, testifies that 
both theories deserve further scientific attention with connection to protest behavior in 
times of harsh and on-going economic and financial crises. Moreover, in the next step, 
they should be weighed against each other.  
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Appendix 
Table 20: Variable overview 
Indicator Source 
Dependent Variable: degree of political protest 
Timing of political protest LexisNexis Academic 
Time span of political protest LexisNexis Academic 
Number of participants LexisNexis Academic 
Form of political protest LexisNexis Academic 
Independent Variable I: degree of aggregated socioeconomic status 
Educational level: total population having 
completed at least upper secondary 
education 
Eurostat 
Income per capita level: income index 
(gross national income per capita) 
HDI 
Occupational status: distribution of 
employment status as % of the active 
population 
Eurostat 
Independent Variable II: degree of political opportunity structure 
Separation of powers: executive 
legislative relations according to Lijphart/ 
judicial independence 
CPDS II / Economic Freedom of the World 
reports (Gwartney/Lawson/Hall 2011). 
Number of influential parties and factions: 
effective number of parties on the seats 
level 
CPDS III 
Level of corporatism: popular initiatives/ 
routine involvement of unions and 
employers in government decisions on 
social and economic policy 
CPDS III/ ICTWSS 
Control Variable I: degree of regional economic closure 
Regional economic ties –  
Control Variable II: degree of economic damage through the crisis 
Quarterly GDP per capita growth rate Eurostat 
Unemployment rate Eurostat 
Inflation rate Eurostat 
Control Variable III: anti-crisis measures 
Wage cuts in the public sector Various, see appendix table 21 
Cuts in public benefit spending Various, see appendix table 21 
Source: own depiction. 
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Table 21: Anti-crisis measures by country 
Country/ 
Anti-crisis 
measure 
Changes in VAT and 
other taxes 
Cuts in public sector 
salaries 
Expenditure in public 
spending 
Cyprus No (1) No (1) Limited impact of the crisis 
on the social security 
scheme;  
Implementation of on-the-
job training programs for 
employees at risk of lay-off 
and unemployed persons (2) 
Denmark Cut of corporate taxation (3) Demands for wage-freeze 
but only for 2011 (1) 
Increases of pension 
allowances for some pension 
groups; 
Subsidies for housing 
projects (4) 
Estonia VAT increase from 18% to 
20%; 
Unemployment insurance 
contribution rate increase 
from 0.9 to 4.2 percent; 
Pollution fees increase by 
20% and fuel excise by 12% 
(7) 
Cuts of -8% to -10% in 
2009 in the general and the 
health sector  and freeze for 
2010-11 (1); 
Major cut-backs in numbers 
of civil service employees (6) 
Cuts in sickness benefits; 
 Freeze of unemployment 
benefits; 
Increased investment in 
adult training; 
Cuts in the health system by 
9% in 2009 and 6% in 2010 
(5) 
Greece Increase in VAT from 19 to 
23 % (8); 
Increased taxes in certain 
commodities like tobacco 
and fuel (10) 
 
-12% to -20% cuts for the 
general public service and 
civil service for 2010; 
Wage freeze for 2011 plus 
cuts in special bonuses (1) 
2008-2009: 
Provision of lump sums to 
pensioners; 
Creation of new jobs in the 
public sector for unemployed 
people; 
Organization of training 
programs for the 
unemployed; 
Social solidarity aids to 
vulnerable employees (9); 
From 2010 onwards:  
Healthcare and pension 
reforms with major cuts (10) 
Hungary Various personal income tax 
reductions in 2009 and 
2010; 
But: increase in VAT of 5% 
(13) 
Employment in public 
service grows; 
Wage freeze and cuts of the 
13th salary for some workers 
in 2009 (11) 
Cuts of social security 
contributions by 5 percent; 
Lump sums for pensioners in 
2009; 
 Increase of daytime care 
places for small children; 
Solidarity packaged for 
people with low incomes and 
―job preservation packages‖ 
for 2009 (12) 
Ireland Introduction of a pension 
levy for non-commercial 
public sector employees (16) 
Freeze of public wages until 
at least 2010  
6% wage cuts of employees 
in the public healthcare and 
education sectors, as well as 
in local and national 
administration, police and 
the armed forces (14) 
Reduction in social security 
payments; 
Reduction of child benefits; 
Reduction of jobseekers 
allowances (15) 
Latvia VAT increase of 3% from 
18% to 21% (18) 
Wage cuts from 15% up to 
30% across the public 
sector, especially in 
education and health (17) 
Pensions cuts planned from 
10% up to 70% for working 
pensioners (declared 
unconstitutional by the 
constitutional court); 
Large cuts in sickness, 
family and unemployment 
benefits (17)  
Lithuania VAT increase from 19% to 
21% (19) 
Cuts of -8% to -10% for civil 
service workers (1) 
Reduction in state pensions 
and social support (20) 
Romania VAT increase from 19% to 
23% (21)(1) 
Cuts up to 25% (2010), but 
cuts in bonuses and other 
additional payments means 
cuts 
Cuts in pensions and social 
benefits up to 15% (the 
pensions cuts were 
announced unconstitutional 
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of up to 50% (21) (1) by the constitutional court 
later) (22) 
Slovenia Decrease of corporate 
taxation (24) 
Wage freeze for 2009 and 
2010 in the public sector (1) 
Pensions reform for 
extended working years; 
Increase of budget for 
subsistence benefits; 
Implementation of in-work 
benefits to retain jobs; 
Support for research and 
development programs (23) 
Spain VAT increase from 16% to 
18% in 2010 (25) 
Wage cuts of 5% for civil  
servants for 2010 (1) 
Cuts in welfare benefits, 
amongst others child 
benefits; Freeze in pensions 
(25) 
United 
Kingdom 
VAT increase from 16,5% to 
20% (26) 
Wage freeze for public 
sector employees for 2010-
2011 (1) 
Measures for the creation of 
new jobs but announcement 
of large social benefit cuts in 
late 2010 (26)  
Sources: 
(1) Glassner 2010, Table 1: 28-31. 
(2) Council of Europe 2010: 16, 40. 
(3) Council of Europe 2010: 34. 
(4) Council of Europe 2010: 29, 44. 
(5) Council of Europe 2010: 24, 27, 40; Knodt/Urdze 
2010: 13; for detailed cuts see Raudla 2011. 
(6) Peters/Pierre/Randma-Liiv 2010: 22. 
(7) Raudla 2011: 8. 
(8) Glassner 2010: 20. 
(9) Council of Europe 2010: 29, 35, 41. 
(10) Nelson/Belkin/Mix 2011: 6-7. 
(11) Glassner 2010: 10, 19. 
(12) Council of Europe 2010: 23, 29, 30, 32, 36; 
Gorzelak 2010: 102 
(13)  Inotai 2010: 21, 28. 
(14)  Glassner 2010: 18. 
(15)  Council of Europe 2010: 17,18. 
(16)  Council of Europe 2010: 34. 
(17)  Glassner 2010: 17. 
(18)  Council of Europe 2010: 18, 26. 
(19)  Council of Europe 2010: 35. 
(20)  Woolfson 2010: 494; Glassner 2010: 17. 
(21)  Glassner 2010: 19. 
(22)  Hoey 2010. 
(23)  Council of Europe 2010: 30, 32, 37; Gorzelak 2010:   219. 
(24)  Council of Europe 2010: 34. 
(25)  Reuters 22.02.2011. 
(26)   Glassner 2010: 21, 41 
 
Table 22: Dispersion of education status 2008-2010 
Country/Time % in 
2008 
% in 
2009 
% in 
2010 
Mean in % 2008 to 2010 
Estonia 88,5 88,9 89,2 88,87 
Greece 61,1 61,2 62,5 61,6 
Ireland 70 71,5 73,5 71,67 
Latvia 85,8 86,8 88,5 87,03 
Lithuania 90,6 91,3 92 91,3 
Romania 75,3 74,7 74,3 74,8 
Spain 51 51,5 52,6 51,7 
United Kingdom 73,4 74,6 76,1 74,7 
Mean    75,2 
Source: European Commission 2011a. 
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Table 23: Income index (gross national income per capita) 
Rank /Country   2008 2009 2010 Mean 2008-2010 
Estonia 0,74 0,724 0,729 0,73 
Greece 0,798 0,795 0,788 0,79 
Ireland 0,833 0,814 0,812 0,82 
Latvia 0,721 0,705 0,706 0,71 
Lithuania 0,735 0,718 0,722 0,73 
Romania 0,682 0,673 0,671 0,66 
Spain 0,805 0,799 0,798 0,8 
United Kingdom 0,838 0,83 0,83 0,83 
Mean    0,75875 
Source: UNDP 2012b.  
Note: the index rages from 0 to 1 with higher scores showing a higher aggregate index. 
 
 
 
Table 24: Percentage of distribution on high and low occupations as a mean for 2008-
2010 
Country/ 
Time 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) MEAN 
high 
(6) (8) (9) MEAN 
low 
Estonia 8,0 11,3 10,3 5,0 10,0 11,6 9,4 1,0 7,6 11,3 6,7 
Ireland 8,0 14,3 5,0 11,0 15,3 5,0 9,8 0,3 6,6 6,6 4,0 
Greece 1,0 10,0 7,0 9,6 10,0 5,0 7,1 0,0 6,0 8,0 3,7 
Spain 2,0 10,0 9,0 7,6 13,0 6,3 8,0 1,0 11,3 9,3 6,2 
Latvia 5,3 12,3 12,0 4,3 10,6 8,3 8,8 1,0 10,0 10,3 6,4 
Lithuania 7,3 15,3 10,0 4,0 9,6 8,3 9,1 1,0 7,0 14,0 5,4 
Romania 1,0 9,3 8,6 4,6 9,0 9,6 7,0 0,0 5,6 13,0 5,1 
United 
Kingdom 
12,0 11,3 10,0 11,0 15,0 4,6 10,7 0,0 8,6 5,3 4,4 
MEAN       8,7    5,2 
Source: Eurostat 2012b. 
Note: ―Mean low‖ is the mean percentage of people occupied in higher status professions, ―Mean 
low‖ is the percentage of people occupied in lower status professions. 
(1)=legislators, senior officials and managers, (2)=professionals, (3)= technicians and  
associate professionals, (4)=clerks, (5)=service workers and shop and market sales workers, 
(6)=skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7)=craft and related trades workers, (8)=plant and 
machine operators and assemblers or (9)= workers in elementary occupations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Julia Simon: Political Protest During Economic Crises 
 
98 
 
Table 25: List of Agence France Presse articles used for DV-Analysis 
Estonia: 
Agence France Presse. 20.01.2009. Estonia plans budget cuts to respect EU deficit limit: 
ministry. 
Agence France Presse. 05.02.2009. Estonia slashes budget as crisis bites. 
Agence France Presse. 05.02.2009. Estonia slashes budget by 8.2 percent as crisis bites. 
Agence France Presse. 13.02.2009. Estonian economy slams into reverse. 
Agence France Presse. 08.04.2009. Fitch cuts Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania ratings. 
Agence France Presse. 16.02.2010. Recession's end little comfort for Estonia's 
unemployed 
Agence France Presse. 09.03.2010. Austerity drives are old news for EU's Baltic states. 
Agence France Presse. 31.12.2010. Anti-euro posters pop up ahead of Estonia's euro 
switch. 
Ireland: 
Agence France Presse. 21.02.2009. Up to 120,000 protest in recession-hit Ireland. 
Agence France Presse. 30.10.2009. Irish PM warns voters as EU treaty poll starts. 
Agence France Presse. 24.11.2009. Ireland hit by public sector strike against cuts. 
Agence France Presse. 01.12.2009. Ireland's public sector calls off national strike. 
Agence France Presse. 30.02.2010. Debt throws Eurozone back towards dangerous 
waters. 
Agence France Presse. 17.10.2010. Irish glass-making city shattered by economic crisis. 
Agence France Presse. 22.11.2010. Ireland bailout boosts euro but sparks political 
chaos. 
Agence France Presse. 23.11.2010. Ireland in political chaos after bailout triggers 
election. 
Agence France Presse. 27.11.2010. 50,000 Irish take to streets over cuts to seal bailout. 
Agence France Presse. 27.11.2010. Irish in mass protest against cuts to seal bailout. 
Agence France Presse. 28.11.2010. Ireland works on bailout as protesters take to 
streets. 
Romania: 
Agence France Presse. 26.03.2009. Romania braces for IMF-linked spending cuts. 
Agence France Presse. 14.05.2009. Protesters in Bucharest demand measures against 
crisis. 
Agence France Presse. 11.08.2009. Romania orders unpaid leave for state employees. 
Agence France Presse. 07.10.2009. Thousands of Romanians protest against austerity 
measures. 
Agence France Presse. 19.05.2009. Romanians rally against austerity cuts. 
Agence France Presse. 22.09.2009. Romanians protest government's austerity 
measures. 
Agence France Presse. 24.10.2010. Some 5,000 Romanian policemen protest over pay 
cuts. 
Agence France Presse. 05.10.2010. Thousands of Romanian teachers protest austerity 
cuts. 
Agence France Presse. 27.10.2010. Romania's government faces no confidence vote 
amid protests. 
Agence France Presse. 27.10.2010. Romania's government faces no-confidence vote 
amid protests. 
Source: own depiction. 
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